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AUDITING EXECUTIVE DISCRETION
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar*
Executive branch officials routinely make thousands of decisions affecting public security and welfare.
While it is rare that such discretionary decisions are entirely immune from some kind of judicial
review, courts’ role is often so circumscribed or deferential that in some domains the probability of
uncovering problems through such review almost certainly falls close to zero. The resulting amount of
executive discretion carries considerable risks along with rewards. Some discretionary decisions
undoubtedly benefit from the speed and flexibility that results from limiting judicial review. Yet
judicial review’s evisceration as a tool to restrain certain forms of discretion also makes it easier for
government officials to subtly manipulate their discretion to promote appealing political impressions,
for others to engage in outright malfeasance, and for still other (more virtuous) officials to simply fail
to learn from their mistakes. Reliance on judicial review to generate information about executive
discretion makes it difficult to address these concerns in part because courts routinely define much of
their work in terms of applying the same standard of deference to every potential case in a particular
class, making it difficult to increase the stringency of review in some policy domains without making
the costs allegedly prohibitive. When deciding how stringently to review a discretionary decision –
whether a prosecutorial charging decision, an administrative compliance order, or an enemy
combatant designation – judges almost invariably mull the potential consequences of their choice on
all future executive decisions of that kind. As a conceptual alternative, this article develops a
framework akin to that employed by courts engaged in sample adjudication for class action and
government fraud cases. It relies on the possibility of systematically auditing samples of discretionary
decisions and making those results public. Although the efficacy of such a system depends on the
political context and details of its institutional design, audits have the potential to sever the connection
between the perceived costs of encroaching on discretion and the stringency of review. They also
avoid the potentially distorted picture of bureaucratic activity created by a litigation-driven process.
Despite their potential value, such audits are nonetheless almost never undertaken by existing federal
audit bureaucracies (the Government Accountability Office and the department-specific Inspector
General Offices), nor does the legislature seem to conduct them in connection with oversight hearings.
I conclude by discussing the political and bureaucratic dynamics working against these audits and
suggesting how they may be weakened.
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INTRODUCTION
The problem is a familiar one. No legal system can ever wholly vanquish
discretion – and even if it were possible, it would be madness to wring all human
judgment from the application of legal rules and standards. But too much discretion
breeds its own kind of madness. To manage this predicament, our government subjects
many decisions to elaborate procedural constraints, but in other domains it ostensibly
seeks to harness the value of human judgment by leaving public officials with
considerable discretion. On a typical day, Labor Department officials decide what plants
to inspect for occupational safety violations with little or no external review. Prosecutors
decide whom to indict. Treasury officials decide whether to freeze the assets of a charity
because of alleged links to terrorism. Homeland security inspectors decide whether a
Namibian woman will be turned away at a port of entry without being allowed to plead
her case for asylum, and whose name is placed on a government “no fly” list. In short,
despite an often-mentioned social commitment to judicial restraints on public power,1
laws routinely create and protect discretion instead of restraining it.2
1

See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)(subjecting an informal,
discretionary decision of the Secretary of Transportation to judicial review on the basis of statutory
language prohibiting federal aid for highways through public parks unless “no feasible and prudent
alternative” existed). Overton Park set the stage for a substantial expansion in the availability (and
stringency) of judicial review governing informal, discretionary decisions. But review remains either
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This absence of restraints, in turn, raises the pressing question of how public
organizations with such considerable discretion will (be forced to) learn from their
mistakes, and how they will be policed against abusing their legal powers. While judicial
review of government action is often considered a central tool in preventing mistakes or
abuses,3 the benefits of maintaining discretion have led to a vigorous doctrinal and policy
debate about the proper stringency of such review.4
This article challenges the terms of that debate. The argument demonstrates how
the paradigm of judicial review, despite its enduring value, sometimes ill-serves the goals
of helping bureaucratic organizations learn from their failures and avoid political
unavailable or fairly cursory for a massive range of discretionary decisions involving national security,
foreign policy, immigration, domestic regulatory enforcement, public benefits, and investigation or
prosecution. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969). Regarding the trope that judicial
review should have an exalted role in constraining arbitrary bureaucratic action, see Rachel E. Barkow,
More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial
Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness
and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003); David Cole, Judging the Next
Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565 (2003);
James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118
HARV. L. REV. 643 (2004).
2
See infra notes__.
3
See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 184 (summarizing previous
interpretation of federal jurisdictional statute by emphasizing the Court’s conclusion that “Congress meant
to hold federal agencies accountable by making their actions subject to judicial review.”); Jerry L. Mashaw,
Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the Neglect and Abuse of Administrative Law,
57 U. PITT. L. REV. 405, 414 (1996)(“The long-term commitment of American administrative law has been
to assure that administrative discretion is structured, checked, and balanced. Administrative efficacy must
be weighed against demands for liberty and legality, as well as political accountability”); Rebecca L.
Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 535 (1998)(emphasizing the
alleged role of judicial review in promoting accountability). Understandably, judicial review is considered
important both because of its role in generating information about, and promoting the accountability of,
executive authorities, and because of its direct remedial role. Regarding “accountability” see, e.g., Jeffrey J.
Rachlinksi and Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L.
REV. 549, 587-89 (2002); Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 509 (2002); Michael Asimow, The Scope of Judicial
Review of Decisions of California Administrative Agencies, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1157, 1239 (1995); William
Christian, Note, Normalization as a Goal: The Americans With Disabilities Act and Individuals With
Mental Retardation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 409, 417 (1994). The importance of providing a hearing and a
remedy for government actions affecting a protected interest, meanwhile, is firmly lodged at the core of
modern procedural due process doctrine. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1974).
4
Voices on one side of the debate emphatically insist on greater opportunities for highly-stringent judicial
review of executive branch actions. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 1, at 216 (“The vast quantities of
unnecessary discretionary power that have grown up in our system should be cut back, and the
discretionary power that is found to be necessary should be properly confined, structured, and checked”);
Cole, supra note 1, at 2567; Nicole Nice-Petersen, Note, Justice for the “Designated”: The Process That is
Due to Alleged U.S. Financiers of Terrorism, 93 GEO. L.J. 1387, 1419 (2005)(“The courts should not
hesitate to act solely because those stripped of their rights are accused terrorists”). Similarly emphatic
voices take the position in equipoise. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating
Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 644 (2003)(“Judicial scrutiny can only interfere with forceful
executive action.’); Ruth R. Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT’L
L. 328 (2002). Similar debates play out in the context of constitutional torts. See, e.g., James J. Park, The
Constitutional Tort Action As Individual Remedy, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 395 (2003). At least
some of the debate turns on differing views about the extent to which a larger “political process” promotes
“accountability.” I discuss this in Part III.
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pressures endangering their missions.5 Because complex public bureaucracies are
increasingly (and perhaps inevitably) the custodians of discretionary legal authority that
can be abused,6 the problems arise both in national security and domestic regulatory
contexts, domains that have been traditionally treated separately but increasingly blur.7
The article then shows how a government agency can perform quasi-judicial audits of
discretionary decisions, akin to the sample audits occasionally employed by courts in
class actions and government fraud cases.8 If an auditing agency overcomes the relevant
9
political barriers and conceptual challenges, it can fill crucial gaps left by existing
mechanisms to generate information about executive branch performance. Even if those
barriers prove too onerous to surmount, the conceptual work associated with designing an
audit system can serve as a thought experiment, clarifying the murkiness of conventional
defenses of broad executive discretion, and shedding light on why such claims
nonetheless resonate in the legal and political arena.
The argument begins by assuming, for expositional purposes, that judicial review
is the only institutional mechanism generating information about discretionary executive
decisions directly affecting individuals or groups, such as whether to decide that an
individual lacking documents at the border has shown enough “credible fear” to be
allowed to apply for asylum. The picture of executive discretion that emerges in such a
world will inevitably depend on the structural features of judicial review. That picture
will reflect, for instance, the courts’ tendency to balance the potential benefits and costs
of discretion by routinely applying differing degrees of stringency when reviewing
executive decisions. Suppose, for instance, that the issue is the fate of individuals that
executive authorities designate as enemy combatants. Whether on their own or in accord
with legislative commands, courts can increase the stringency of review by requiring
more thorough hearings before someone is designated, and by decreasing the deference
accorded to the outcome of those hearings or (in the absence of hearings) to the executive
determinations themselves.10 Greater stringency of review presumably reduces the
5

Although this article does not directly address judicial review’s role as provider of individual remedies,
the argument developed here is nonetheless relevant to the provision of remedies by either courts or
political actors. See supra notes __ (discussing the relevance of the argument to court review of individual
cases); __ (discussing the implications of the argument for how political actors deliver remedies to
aggrieved individuals or groups).
6
The focus here is primarily on the type of discretion, such as that vested in a prosecutorial authority, to
impose costs on discrete individuals or groups with minimal judicial intervention. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821 (1985)(in the absence of specific statutory requirement to the contrary, regulatory agency’s
decision not to exercise authority in a particular context where such authority could be exercised is
committed to agency discretion) See also infra note__ and accompanying text.
7
Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2672 (2005)(“In war no
less than in peace, the inquiry into presidential authority can be organized and disciplined if it is undertaken
with close reference to standard principles of administrative law.”).
8
See infra note __.
9
For a discussion of the proverbial “guarding the guardians” problem, see infra notes 190-191 and
accompanying text.
10
Compare Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 602-04 (1988)(finding CIA director’s power to fire employee
on national security grounds committed by law to agency discretion) with Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands
th
Center v. Bureau of Land Mgt., 387 F.3d 989 (9 Cir. 2004)(finding, under an arbitrary and capricious
standard that the court understood to require “hard look” review, that the Bureau of Land Management’s
environmental assessments of two timber sales, conducted pursuant to the National Environmental Policy
Act, were inadequate because they failed to consider the cumulative impact of the sales). I do not mean to
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probability that someone would be improperly labeled an enemy combatant. At the same
time, greater stringency allegedly increases the resources that society must expend on the
review process and that the executive branch must expend defending its decision.11 If
stricter review consumes substantially greater resources or creates a material possibility
of embarrassment for executive officials, it may also chill the authorities from
designating individuals that should (in an ideal world) receive such a designation. In
response, courts tend to vary the stringency of review governing a given pool of potential
cases.
But this strategy of applying a given degree of review stringency across the board
entails its own costs. By forging rules applying to every case in a particular class, courts
and legislators can impose dramatic limits on society’s ability to learn how executive
discretion is used.12 Increasing the stringency of review for a single decision appears
difficult, if not impossible, without sharply (and, it is sometimes asserted, dangerously)
increasing costly burdens on courts and the government. Even if one assumes
(implausibly) that existing rules governing stringency of review reflects a careful analysis
of marginal costs and benefits, existing limits on review stringency almost certainly
augur problems for society’s ability to learn how discretion is used.
Government regulators and private employers, in contrast, routinely manage to
avoid such traps. Instead of reviewing an entire population’s behavior, they obtain
samples of it. Insurance companies examine a subset of closed files to assess the quality
of payout determinations.13 Government agents select a subset of plants to inspect or
accounting records to scrutinize.14 The tactic can be easily adapted by a court-supervised
or independent authority to generate information about public bureaucracies. The
defining feature of this technique is its rejection of an implicit assumption that a given
degree of review stringency should be applied to all cases in a class. Despite their
minimize the subtleties of the variegated constitutional, statutory, and prudential doctrines on which courts
(and even legislatures) draw when they decide on how much discretion to grant. Separation of powers,
deference to national security and foreign policy decisions, judicial deference to expert determinations of
government agencies, and statutory interpretation techniques all figure in this process. Even the two cases I
cite here represent extraordinarily different contexts, and the kinds of discretion involved in the decision
are also different. The point here is how nearly any plausible applications of such doctrines require (or, at
the very least, allow) some consequentialist balancing of the costs and benefits associated with discretion,
and different ways of striking that balance are associated with distinct degrees of stringency in the court’s
review of some executive decision. As these two cases show, courts indeed strike different balances when
applying these doctrines, and in the process, they set different degrees of stringency for the review of
discretionary executive decisions.
11
See, e.g., Reply Brief for the Petitioner, Supreme Court of the United States, Heckler v. Chaney, 1984
WL 566059, 4 (November 23, 1984)(“[R]espondents’ submission, if accepted, would allow anyone to seek
judicial review of the agency’s decision not to bring enforcement proceedings under any portion of the
Act.”)(emphasis added); Brief for the Respondents, Supreme Court of the United States, Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 2004 WL 724020, 12 (March 29, 2004)(arguing that further factual development of the
circumstances surrounding an alleged enemy combatant’s designation as such “would divert the military’s
attention from the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan…”).
12
Moralistic intuitions about the importance horizontal equity combine with the content of legal doctrines
such as stare decisis to complicate the possibility of using differing degrees of stringency to review cases in
the same class. See infra Part I.b.
13
See infra Part I.c.
14
See id.
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relative absence from discussions of how to constrain government discretion, audits of
this kind are familiar from a panoply of private and public sector contexts. By providing
an alternative to imposing a single stringency standard across the board, audits can
disrupt the familiar, repetitive debate about whether society deserves greater judicial
protection of its rights and prerogatives. Put differently, even if one accepts the executive
branch’s strident (and often questionable) assertions that the sky would fall if discretion
were more easily reviewed in court, there remains a viable option for assessing that
discretion without incurring the various costs associated with traditional judicial review.
Nor would audits merely duplicate, in a different form, what judicial review could
already achieve. Under quite reasonable assumptions, deferential judicial review may be
worse from a prescriptive standpoint than review using audits even though the costs may
be similar. The absence of audits, conversely, diminishes our system’s capacity to detect
executive branch manipulation.15 It may also dampen the incentives of executive branch
bureaucracies to learn from their mistakes, and makes it easy for key actors in the system
to avoid articulating (either in statutory or executive mandates) what standards are
actually supposed to govern executive discretion. Together these dynamics ultimately
affect the costs and benefits of laws that grant the executive branch discretion in the first
place, and also the political context governing those grants of legal power. The
information on bureaucratic performance generated by audits could even dynamically
influence courts deciding how stringently to review government action, or whether such
16
action comports with procedural due process norms. Ultimately, audits may also exert
an impact on the political context shaping the allocation of power to government. In
principle, that context should reflect an accountability-power trade-off, where political
audiences may prove willing to see the executive branch get more power but only if it
could be reliably supervised. While the devil may be in the details, Part II surveys some
of these problems and discusses how they might be plausibly resolved.
Part III then relaxes the assumption that judicial review is the only institutional
mechanism generating information about executive discretion. It examines the behavior
of two sets of actors capable of producing the sort of accountability-enhancing
information that intrusive judicial review can. The Government Accountability Office
(GAO) and the Inspectors General (IG) offices, which might be termed “audit
bureaucracies,” possess a broad mandate to audit federal government activities and
produce information about how laws are implemented. Although they operate in a
complex political environment shaped by the legislature and the executive branch, they
are not subject to the constraints that ostensibly lead courts to fashion stringency
standards applying across the board to all potential cases in a particular class. Similarly,
15

Of course, the mere creation of some auditing system does not automatically solve organizational
learning and accountability problems involving the law. As noted in Part II, a great deal depends on details
of institutional design. The impact of an audit system also depends on the public’s response, and the
institutional dynamics affecting that response. Audit systems can be counterproductive if they merely
provide a false sense of security – which is in some sense precisely my criticism of judicial review in many
of the contexts I discuss in this paper. Nonetheless, the status quo seems even more likely to provide
precisely that false sense of security because it lacks many of the potential advantages that a carefullystructured audit system could generate. For a thoughtful discussion of the role of audits and the pitfalls in
designing them, see MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION (1999).
16
See infra Part II.b (discussing the potential for dynamic interaction between audits and judicial review).

7
the legislature itself can use its investigative powers directly to generate information
about how executive discretion is exercised.
Yet audits of executive discretion generally are not a feature of modern
governance. Amidst the swirl of budget votes in Congress, committee hearings, GAO
investigations of FBI computers, and IG reports on immigration policy, neither
legislatures nor the audit bureaucracies focus on systematically auditing executive
discretion.17 As Part IV indicates, the relative absence of sampling techniques may reflect
conceptual blurring of the direct remedy and information-producing remedies that bedevil
courts, and probably lead courts to under-use the sampling methodologies that some
judges have cautiously deployed in class actions and government fraud cases. In
addition, legislators and organized interests, like the executive branch itself, may lack
incentives to deploy audits or analogous sampling methodologies. This pattern of neglect
predictably affects how legislatures bargain over executive power and review the
consequences of those bargains. It also affects how legislative goals percolate through
the audit bureaucracies, drawing their attention to procurement fraud and similarly
tangible examples of waste. Second, to the extent that the audit bureaucracies retain
some autonomy to allocate their resources, they appear to remain in the thrall of their
initial role as financial auditors and the more-recently acquired role of auditor of
government performance that nonetheless generally fails to encompass sampling. While
this picture is not immediately encouraging, it does suggest that as audit bureaucracies
expand their autonomy, they may be able to entice a constituency to value audits of
executive discretion if agency leaders choose to pursue such a goal.
Even in the face of such efforts to enhance the organizational autonomy of the
audit bureaucracies, the preceding factors may nonetheless continue locking in
suboptimal institutional responses to serious legal problems. This case study and thought
experiment therefore aims to highlight three crucial challenges that follow from that sort
of lock-in: (1) the importance of recognizing the inherent limitations of traditional
judicial review as a means of managing government discretion, (2) the value of
envisioning new institutional designs to manage discretion more effectively, and (3) the
need for reasonable strategies to implement those designs in a politically complicated
world. In response to those challenges, this article seeks to broaden the scope of potential
solutions and shed light on the forces that shape public perceptions of whether those
solutions even exist.
I.
THE LOGIC OF AUDITING EXECUTIVE DISCRETION
It is commonplace for scholars and policymakers to extol the role of judicial
institutions in ensuring that rights are respected, that agencies do not exceed their legal
powers, and that the law is correctly applied.18 Legislators have bolstered the judicial
17

As Part I.c explains, this means that the audit bureaucracies generally appear not to: (1) take random
samples of decisions (2) in an important legal domain where decisions directly affect individuals or groups,
(3) assess those decisions in accordance with a defensible standard and announce the results to the public.
18
See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Interbranch Accountability in State Government and the Constitutional
Requirement of Judicial Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21 (1998), and sources cited supra at
note 1.
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role over the years by enacting procedural controls, such as those contained in the
Administrative Procedure Act, enhancing their ability to assert control over the
bureaucracy and limiting the scope of executive discretion.19
Despite these developments, court review of executive decisions is sometimes
exceedingly modest, or entirely missing.20 The pattern recurs in domains involving both
national security and more traditional domestic administrative action. Sometimes
legislators explicitly confer enormous discretion, prohibiting all or most judicial review
of certain decisions, by embedding a limiting provision in an agency’s legal mandate.
The law says that the CIA Director, for instance, has authority to fire employees for being
national security risks. It also says he has the power to define what “national security
risk” means, which lets him arbitrarily fire someone for being gay (he has).21 In other
cases, executive agencies have discretionary powers because prevailing statutory
interpretations and constitutional provisions imply the existence of such power. Courts
have recursively found that prosecutors harbor an inherent power to choose whom to
charge with few (if any) judicially-imposed constraints.22 In still other cases agencies
have discretionary power because courts and other external observers review certain
kinds of executive decisions with great deference, which leaves the president, the
agencies he supervises, and similar executive authorities with residual control over
governance.23 The resulting degree of executive discretion lets agencies act swiftly in
domains where they hold responsibility, learn to deal with unfamiliar situations, and
leverage their expertise.24
Yet discretion’s two-edged nature constantly reiterates the prescriptive question
of how best to render accountable the executive bureaucracies wielding such power. This
Part explains why audits of discretionary decisions should play a prominent role in
answering that question.
A. How Executive Discretion is Pervasive
i. Overview and Definitions

19

See generally, McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L.ECON. &
ORG. 180 (1999); Peter L. Strauss, Changing Times: The APA at Fifty, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1389 (1996).
20
Even when all or most alternative review is precluded, courts can restrain egregious government conduct
of some kinds, such as those that might give rise to viable constitutional tort claims. See Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). But courts proceed
with extreme caution in this realm given their concern that the scope of a claim they recognize (and the
remedies they might make available) would interfere with some of the more valuable properties associated
with executive discretion. See generally PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR
OFFICIAL WRONGS (1983).
21
Webster, 486 U.S. at 602-04.
22
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). As Davis cogently observed, “[a] judicial trial is an
acceptance of a prosecutor’s decision to prosecute, not a review of it. Even a quick finding of not guilty
may leave untouched the harms that flow from the prosecution.” Davis, supra note 1, at 209 n.21.
23
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
24
See Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104
YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Saikrishna B. Prakash and Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001); John C. Yoo, War, Responsibility, and the Age of Terrorism, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 793 (2004).
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For present purposes, discretion can be defined as the extent of legal flexibility to
use government power vested in executive branch officials – including, but not limited to,
personnel, budgets, information, and legally-sanctioned coercive authority to affect the
world.25 Distinctions in the amount of executive discretion are relative, not absolute.
Government officials exercise a certain measure of discretion virtually every time they do
something. Though government actions are rarely purely discretionary, neither is
discretion ever entirely absent. The distinctions that lawyers and policymakers fight over
tend to be about whether to give the executive branch relatively more, or relatively less
discretion compared to a certain baseline.
Courts and commentators have long acknowledged the importance of some
deviations from that baseline. Thus, while the classic case of Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe firmly establishes close judicial scrutiny of a discretionary
decision as a presumptive means of policing executive decisions,26 other cases among the
administrative law canon make an equally compelling case for a greater measure of
discretion. In some cases the Court famously recognized the existence of domains of
government authority best left, for structural reasons, entirely to the political branches.27
A somewhat different form of discretion is the subject of Heckler v. Chaney,28 where the
Court considered the appropriate degree of judicial scrutiny of a regulatory agency’s
discretionary enforcement decisions, and emphasized the value of limiting judicial
intervention in such matters by analogizing regulatory enforcement discretion to
prosecutorial discretion in the criminal context.29 It is this form of targeted discretion to
directly affect individuals and groups that most resembles the “executive discretion” with
which this article is concerned. As many commentators have acknowledged, preserving
the type of prosecutorial discretion at issue in Heckler from judicial intervention raises
the risk that executive authorities will behave in an arbitrary fashion.30
When lawyers advocating on behalf of executive power extol the value of such
Heckler-type executive discretion, they nonetheless tend to implicitly accept a baseline
25

One could imagine, in contrast, a different type of discretion, understood to require by definition –
perhaps for political reasons – the absence of review. Efforts to subject this sort of discretion, associated
(for instance) with the political question doctrine, to review would be (by definition) ill-advised.
Nonetheless, one of the goals of the discussion that follows is to highlight the value of being more explicit
about why certain types of discretionary decisions should be entirely insulated from review.
26
401 U.S. 402 (1971).
27
See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). As I acknowledge below,
perhaps there are indeed some contexts where discretion does (and ought to) mean no review -- from
courts, auditors, or anyone else. My suggestion is simply that we ought to proceed with great caution in
considering the rationales for that kind of discretion. In particular, we ought to recognize that the rationales
for limiting or even barring judicial review in some contexts do not necessarily speak to the question of
whether we should also bar an alternative form of review. Put differently, perhaps one might envision an
array of review mechanisms to address the fact that the two kinds of discretion are on a continuum, and at
intermediate places on the continuum we might do well to use audits (or some other system of review)
instead of leaving the executive unrestrained.
28
470 U.S. at 821.
29
The analogy bolstered the Court’s case for limiting judicial interference in the Heckler context (involving
the Food and Drug Administration) because the perception was already so deeply-rooted among courts that
judicial regulation of prosecutorial discretion would unduly burden the administration of justice. Cf.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 664 (1978).
30
See infra note __.
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state of the world where courts play a significant role in reviewing government action.31
Such recognition of the value of judicial supervision is a familiar one in the United States
and in most other developed nations (and many developing ones).32 In criminal
prosecutions, voting rights cases, and labor law injunctions, for example, the completion
of some action of the executive branch (such as subjecting someone to the detriments
associated with being convicted of a crime) is conditioned on judicial approval.
Observers and policymakers may have different political views about how easy it should
be to impose a labor injunction (for example) or convict someone of a crime. But if they
fail in persuading the legislature to water down the substantive standard that applies,
advocates of discretion are left to mount a vigorous case before a court that is quite
persistently unwilling to simply defer to executive discretion. Even when such review
does not occur in advance of government action, the executive branch presumably labors
in the shadow of the embarrassing possibility that a license grant, a regulatory rule, a
criminal conviction, or a statutory enactment will be subsequently invalidated.33 This
implies that we can measure the benefits of executive discretion against a baseline of
relatively intrusive judicial review.
ii. Examples
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See, e.g., Brief for Respondent, Supreme Court of the United States, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2004 WL
724020 (March 29, 2004). The government’s language in the brief is typical of the positions that lawyers
for the executive branch have taken in this Administration – and not dramatically different (on the core
issue of deference – from that taken by lawyers for other presidential administrations. It states:
As this Court has observed, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority
of the Executive in military and national security affairs. The customary deference that courts
afford the Executive in matters of military affairs is especially warranted in this context. A
commander’s wartime determination that an individual is an enemy combatant is a
quintessentially military judgment, representing a core exercise of the Commander-in-Chief
authority. Especially in the course of hostilities, the military through its operations and
intelligence-gathering has an unmatched vantage point from which to learn about the enemy and
make judgments as to whether those seized during a conflict are friend or foe.

Id. at 25-26 (citations omitted).
32
This statement should not obscure the massive extent of variation among legal systems, many of which
assign quite different roles to judicial institutions. The point is that it’s quite common for those different
systems to assign considerable importance to the goal of reviewing executive action through courts. See
generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99,
101 (1994).
33
Actually measuring the precise impact of review with some analytical clarity is enormously complex, but
a number of scholars have made convincing arguments to this effect using qualitative or quantitative
methodologies in different contexts. For some cogent examples, see JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID HARFST,
THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990)(suggesting that NHTSA’s reliance on costly recalls of
questionable safety effects rather than prospective rulemaking has in part been driven by the impact of
intrusive judicial review in rulemaking); Thomas O. McGarity, The Role of Government Attorneys in
Regulatory Agency Rulemaking, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19 (1998)(discussing the impact of the
“ossification” of rulemaking, where judicial review among other factors shapes agencies’ willingness to use
regulatory authority); Brandice Canes-Wrone, Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower
Courts, 47 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 205 (2003)(analyzing whether changes in the ideological composition of lower
courts affected decisions of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to grant permits for development of
wetlands, and finding that a standard deviation increase in estimated pro-environmental ideology of the
lower courts decreased the probability that the Corps would grant a permit by 14%).
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To better assess the potential benefits and costs of departing from a baseline of
intrusive judicial review, we should first analyze how executive authorities may use their
discretion in a few specific contexts arising in both national security and domestic
regulatory enforcement. Consider, for instance, the following examples.
1. Asset Freezing – Under current law, government officials have powerful tools
to regulate the economic activities of foreign persons. One such tool, involving
designations under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (or “IEEPA”),34
lets the president “block,” or freeze access to, any property subject to United States
jurisdiction, when two conditions apply. First, the property in question must be
something in which a foreign country or national has an interest.35 This constraint turns
out not to be much of a limitation on the president’s power, since courts have found that
the “foreign” interest does not have to be a legal interest of any kind. The mere fact that
an American organization has foreign beneficiaries may be enough, in fact, for a court to
say that it has a “foreign interest.”36 Second, the president must use this power only
during an emergency.37 This is not much of a limitation, either. The “unusual and
extraordinary threat” giving rise to the emergency must have its source partly outside the
United States.38 It must pose a threat to the “national security, foreign policy, or
economy of the United States.”39 Given the combined effect of this expansive language
and traditional judicial deference on matters of national security and foreign affairs,
presidents have found it relatively easy to declare emergencies under the law (about ten
of which are currently in effect).40 Courts have yet to find, under the terms of IEEPA,
that a supposed emergency does not exist.
In a series of executive orders, the President has delegated much of his authority
under IEEPA to the Secretaries of State and Treasury. Under the resulting system, the
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control blocks the assets of groups that branded
“Specially Designated Terrorist Organizations.”41 Once a group becomes a specially
designated terrorist organization, it loses control over its fate. The impact of OFAC’s
orders is to block the organization’s funds, regardless of where in the financial system
they happen to be. Each violation of the blocking orders can trigger a separate civil fine
of up to $10,000, and willful violators are subject to criminal penalties, including up to
ten years’ imprisonment and fines of up to $50,000 per violation.42 A similar designation
also triggers severe criminal penalties punishing individuals for providing “material

34

International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 et seq (“IEEPA”). See generally
James J. Savage, Executive Use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act – Evolution Through
the Terrorist and Taliban Sanctions, 10 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 28 (2001).
35
Id.
th
36
See Global Relief Fdn. V. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748 (7 Cir. 2002).
37
See IEEPA, supra note 70.
38
See Holy Land Fdn. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 159 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
39
Id.
40
See generally Jason Luong, Note, Forcing Constraint: The Case for Amending the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1181 (2000).
41
333 F.3d at 160.
42
50 U.S.C. § 1705 (2004).

12
support” (including funds and in-kind economic contributions such as lodging) to
designated terrorist organizations.43
Take a closer look at how a court reviews the government’s designations. In the
recent Holy Land Foundation case, the State and Treasury departments used their
delegated presidential IEEPA powers to freeze the assets of the Holy Land Foundation.44
Court review of the blocking order considered whether it was “arbitrary and capricious”
under the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act. But given the national security
context of the decision, the reviewing district and appellate courts also interpreted the
relevant law to require a highly deferential form of review. The District Court, for
example, emphasized the limited scope of its role. The key factual question, the District
Court and the litigants agreed, was the extent of HLF’s connection to Hamas, another
specially designated terrorist organization (and one that, at least at this point, few people
had reason to doubt as a “terrorist organization”). The district court conducted a careful
examination of the record and uncovered “ample” evidence that:
(1) HLF has had financial connects to Hamas since its creation in 1989; (2) HLF
leaders have been actively involved in various meetings with Hamas leaders; (3)
HLF funds Hamas-controlled charitable organizations; (4) HLF provides financial
support to the orphans and families of Hamas martyrs and prisoners; (5) HLF’s
Jerusalem office acted on behalf of Hamas; and (6) FBI informants reliably
reported that HLF funds Hamas.45
The D.C. Circuit upheld this determination on appeal.46 In doing so, the court
legitimized a review process that arguably renders administrable the federal
government’s web of emergency economic regulatory powers. That process might also
strike some observers as particularly thorough. But whatever one’s views about the
former issue, the latter perception is mistaken, for at least two reasons. First, the court
considers only whether the decision was “arbitrary and capricious,” and based on
“substantial evidence,” not whether it was right or wrong. That determination, moreover,
reflects a statutory text (the APA and IEEPA) and tradition that makes the court’s inquiry
extremely deferential and perhaps helps explain why so few of these determinations get
challenged in court (because it’s not clear what will be gained). Second, as a practical
matter, the court’s inquiry (even where, as in Holy Land, the district court pushes the
envelope in terms of the stringency of its review) begins and ends with the record that the
government itself compiles. As the district court itself noted in this case, the arbitrary
and capricious standard “does not allow the courts to undertake their own fact-finding,
but [instead only allows the court] to review the agency’s record to determine whether the
agency’s decision was supported by a rational basis.”47 That record may be a
tremendously accurate complication of the government’s evidence. Or it may be patently
misleading. Nothing requires the government to report evidence tending to cast doubt on
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See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9 Cir. 2000).
333 F.3d at 159-60.
45
333 F.3d at 161.
46
333 F.3d at 161-63.
47
See Holy Land, 219 F.Supp.2d at 67.
44
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its contentions.48 Nor does the court interview the sources on which the record is based.
Which means that, even in the best of circumstances, the court’s review is only as good
as the record.
The flip side of this point is that court review is likely to exert only a limited
impact on the quality of that record. A court will vacate the designation if the record in
question turns out to be an empty folder. On the other hand, officials who want to evade
that possibility need only make sure there is a thick enough record to make it hard for the
court to conclude that such a record makes the designation look totally arbitrary. Yet the
record itself is based on decisions that are essentially immune from review.49
2. No-Fly Lists –When passengers check in at American airports, their names
generally are compared to those on a list provided to airlines by the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA).50 Predictably enough, the point of the list is to thwart the
(travel) plans of those who might prove dangerous on board a flight.51 Although TSA
initially denied the existence of this list (technically an element of a system known as
CAPPS I), subsequent disclosures establish that TSA considers an important component
of aviation security even in light of recent efforts to supplement it with a more elaborate
system.52
Yet TSA and the airlines have run into a spate of difficulties using the list.
Sometimes people whose names are merely similar to those on the list are detained.
Some individuals actually named on the list are virtually never completely denied the
chance to fly; they are instead detained, at times forced to miss their flight, and subjected
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Ironically enough, the Holy Land appeals panel suggested that the government’s position was
strengthened by the fact that “there was no plausible evidence presented which showed that [ties to Hamas]
had been severed.” 333 F.3d at 162.
49
Manipulation of the record, moreover, need not be conscious or explicit. A number of pressures and
considerable number of investigators, analysts, spies, lawyers, and higher level officials whose work
influences the record that the court reviews. As long as they feel at least some subtle pressure to support
the conclusion that a designation should be made, they may fail to consider countervailing arguments, or
the potential consequences of an “erroneous” designation (i.e., erroneous in the sense of not complying
with the statute, the president’s executive order, the “arbitrary and capricious” standard, or the executive
branch’s stated goals for using the IEEPA emergency powers)].
50
See Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening
System Faces Significant Implementation Challenges, GAO 04-385 (Feb. 2004)(“GAO Report”).
51
A subsidiary purpose may also be to promote the questioning and apprehension of suspicious individuals
who may be sought by law enforcement authorities.
52
See generally Green v. TSA, 351 F.Supp.2d 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2005). See also GAO Report, supra note
86, at 9. For developments since February 2004, see Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security:
Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but Risks Should Be Managed as System is Further
Developed, GAO-05- 356 (March 2005). The agency has been rushing to implement a long-delayed new
system, since shortly after September 11, but the process has proven fraught with delays. See EPIC v. Dep’t
of Homeland Security, __ F.Supp.2d __, 2005 WL 1745303 (July 25, 2005). For developments since
February 2004, see Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and
Testing Under Way, but Risks Should Be Managed as System is Further Developed, GAO-05-356 (March
2005). The agency has been rushing to implement a long-delayed new system, since shortly after
September 11, but the process has proven fraught with delays. The advent of the new system, however, is
unlikely to lead to the complete demise of some version of the current process, as the government will
likely retain a “core” list of people who should be detained when they attempt to travel. See also GAO
Report, supra note __, at 9.
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to extensive questioning.53 Even assuming some of the problems with the list’s use could
be remedied, it would seem as though there should be some procedure to police the list,
so that people who are erroneously placed there could be taken off.
Nothing of the sort appears to exist.54 Instead, people who plainly should not be
on the list are bewildered to learn that they cannot even find out how their name appeared
on the list, let alone what must be done to remove it.55 A member of the Air Force
reporting for duty found his name on the list. A mother checking in at Dulles Airport for
a flight to Italy discovered her gurgling nine-month old son’s name was on the list, which
prevented the desk agent from printing out a boarding pass.56 TSA may be
understandably reluctant to reveal the quality of its methods and sources, either because it
seeks to avoid sensitizing potential terrorists to the extent of their strengths or alerting the
larger public to the extent of their weaknesses. But that still leaves the question of how
the quality of the list will be policed, particularly given the apparent absence of any
reliable, consistent review mechanism to ensure the names on the list belong there.57
Reasonable people can differ with respect to how much discretion TSA should
have in deciding what information to consider in administering the list. What is harder to
deny is the absence of any specific statutory provision to resolve disputes about the
58
propriety of placing a person’s name on the list. Efforts to persuade a court that that the
TSA’s decision to place a name on the list was “arbitrary and capricious,” moreover,
would encounter the same problems associated with the blocking of assets, where courts
have apply an exceedingly deferential standard that essentially fails to encompass review
of how the agency obtained the information that allegedly supports its determination.59
This leaves aggrieved parties with the option of a lawsuit claiming that their treatment as
a result of being placed on the list amounts to a due process violation.60 Regardless of the
outcome, the no-fly list illustrates why due process claims may be a poor vehicle for
policing this type of discretion. Assuming the litigants persuade a court that the problems
they confront while flying amount to an interference with a protected liberty or (less
likely) property interest, they would still have to persuade a court that existing procedures
53

See GAO Report, supra note __, at 13.
See id. (discussing the absence of internal verification systems in TSA-administered passenger
prescreening programs); id. at 36-38 (indicating how GAO did not itself audit names placed on the list as
part of its methodology).
55
Some individuals apparently on the list who write their congressional representative have been told to
bring along multiple forms of identification to prove they are not the person named on the list. This
obviously does not address the problem of the person actually named on the list who seeks to contest that
designation. Individuals who write TSA may also obtain a letter that is supposed to mitigate the impact of
being found on the list. But presentation of the letter to airline or TSA authorities at the airport is no
guarantee that a person whose name appears on the list will be allowed to travel. See Drees, supra note __.
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Caroline Drees, U.S. No-Fly List Vexes Travelers From Babies On Up, REUTERS ONLINE, (Dec. 19,
2005), avail. at. http://today.reuters.com/news/newsarticle.aspx type=domesticNews&storyid=2005-12
15T151246Z_01_SIB554549_RTRUKOC_0_US-SECURITY-NOFLY.xml&rpc=22 (last accessed Dec.
19, 2005)(observing how the suspected nine-month old terrorist “sat there and gurgled,” and noting that the
list apparently includes Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative Don Young among others).
57
See GAO Report, supra note 86, at 13.
58
Persons may complain to an ombudsperson or directly to the agency, but there is no administrative
mechanism to resolve such complaints.
59
An arbitrary and capricious claim would also confront an additional hurdle in this context,
60
Such a lawsuit is currently pending.
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violate the interest-balancing test rooted in Mathews v. Eldridge.61 That would be a
tough sell given the strength of the interest the government would assert in promoting
aviation security. Which leaves the quality of the list dependent on the bureaucracy’s
behavior.
3. Environmental and Occupational Safety Administrative Compliance Orders –
By subjecting individuals to severe practical and reputational consequences, harsh
criminal indictments may operate as discretionary sanctions. But individuals and
organizations tend to face formal punishments in the criminal justice system only after
they are convicted or admit their guilt. Statutes creating major regulatory programs
reflect a different premise. Many such laws allow regulators to levy fines or issue orders
restricting certain activities with more limited court intervention. Although they vary in
the relevant legal standard or the size of the maximum fine, those orders can have an
effect before judicial intervention. Even after that intervention, it is not clear how well
the stringency of review provided by courts (which tends to conform to some variation of
the “arbitrary and capricious” or “abuse of discretion” standards) strikes the most
desirable balance between restraining abuse and providing regulatory flexibility.
For instance, when the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
or its contractors has some reason to think businesses are violating their general duty to
provide a safe working environment, the agency can issue abatement orders and
citations.62 Although parties may (and often do) contest citations, doing so is expensive,
which means some parties just pay the relatively meager fines OSHA tends to assess
instead of contesting them. Penalties for violating compliance orders are considerably
more severe under environmental statutes, like the Clean Air Act.63 Under that statute,
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can issue an Administrative Compliance
Order (ACO) on the basis of “any information available to it,” directing a regulated party
– such as an electricity generation plant – or state agency to comply with the Clean Air
Act’s requirements. While the ACO does not allow EPA to impose fines or other
penalties directly, the order triggers provisions imposing civil or criminal penalties for
violation of the order.64 Under the terms of the Act, it initially appeared as though
judicial review of an ACO was supposed to focus on whether the regulated party violated
the terms of the order, not whether the EPA was right to issue it in the first place.65 This
has understandably raised questions about how the order itself should be reviewed. In
recent cases, the Supreme Court and several circuit courts have left some uncertainty
about whether the ACO structure withstands constitutional scrutiny given its due process
implications. At least one circuit has found ACOs not to be final agency actions, thereby
rendering them unreviewable and raising the due process problem.66 The Supreme Court
declined to review this case, and instead – in a separate case – upheld a Ninth Circuit
61

See Green, 351 F.Supp 2d. at 1124-7 (denying due process challenge to the no-fly list from passengers
who had been detained but eventually allowed to fly).
62
See 29 U.S.C. §§664(a), 666(a), 666(b), and 666(c).
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Clean Air Act ("the Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q.
64
See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) and (c)(2000). For a detailed discussion, see generally Jason D. Nichols,
Towards Reviving the Efficacy of Administrative Compliance Orders: Balancing Due Process Concerns
and the Need for Enforcement Flexibility in Environmental Law, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 193 (2005).
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See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(2).
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See TVA v. Whitman, 226 F.3d 1236 (11 Cir. 2003).
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opinion holding ACOs to be final agency actions and reviewing them under the “arbitrary
and capricious” standard.67
Both contexts leave the agencies considerable discretion to impose compliance
orders. OSHA obviously has it when it issues citations and abatement orders, some of
which are not challenged subsequently. Even if arbitrary and capricious review is not as
deferential in this context is it is with asset freezes, it still leaves the court applying a
fairly deferential standard of review to a decision that can be based on “any available
information.” It is quite plausible that the extent of resulting stringency in review is a
reasonable compromise if the standard is going to be applied across the board, to every
compliance order. It is also quite possible that such review will not say much about the
quality of compliance order decisions, which could (or perhaps should) ultimately affect
the extent of confidence in the regulatory structures. Put differently, more exhaustive
review of regulatory decisions to impose compliance orders could change the bundle of
substantive powers and penalties that could be acceptable to an enacting legislative and
interest group coalition.
*

*

*

The preceding examples demonstrate the limits of judicial scrutiny for certain
vital government functions. Indeed, even the availability of substantive review can
conceal vast reservoirs of bureaucratic flexibility. A host of other domains – varying in
the availability of formal review but not in the fact that they leave authorities with
discretion – pose similar problems. Such domains involve, among others, the impact of
prosecutors’ charging decisions on suspects, the meager judicial scrutiny of discretion
vested government contractors engaged in quasi-official functions,68 the enormous power
federal officials wield (even in the wake of recent Supreme Court decisions on the
subject) in designating enemy combatants,69 and even in the myriad decisions governing
federal procurement predicated on the exercise of government officials’ legal
discretion.70 How, then, should courts and legislatures react if they consider the existing
degree of external scrutiny to be inadequate?
B. How Discretion Is Routinely Managed Through Variations in the Stringency of Court
Review
The answer is not, obviously, to maximally limit discretion, something courts and
legislatures are understandably loath to do. Instead, judges and lawmakers tend to
manage the costs and benefits of discretion by varying the stringency of review that is
supposed to apply to the actions of the executive or her agent. Whether courts are driven
to do this by anodyne judicial prudence or rigid legislative mandates, they review some
67

See Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation V. EPA, 53 U.S. 1186 (2003); Alaska Dep’t of Envtl.
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Conservation v. EPA, 298 F.3d 814 (9 Cir. 2002).
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See generally Gillian Metzger, Privatization As Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003). See also
Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined,
Outsourced Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 549 (2005).
69
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518-19.
70
See Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 165 (2000)(noting that, despite
the “highly technocratic approach to contract design” prevalent in federal procurement law, the existing
framework is “too limited to address the much more substantial issues that arise” in some contracts).
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decisions more stringently, and others less so.71 Even decisions putatively subject to the
same standard of review, such as the familiar arbitrary and capricious touchstone
enshrined in the Administrative Procedure Act, may end up being reviewed with different
degrees of stringency. The distinctions presumably reflect courts’ judgments about when
the costs of added scrutiny are justified.72 Thus, judges and scholars generally take
arbitrary and capricious review to mean one thing (milder review) for a typical informal
adjudication, such as deciding whether a vehicle fits standards permitting to enter a
national forest, and another (more stringent review) when courts are reviewing an
intricate regulatory rule governing the licensing of nuclear reactors.73
Stringency of review is what distinguishes these two different versions of the
arbitrary and capricious standard, and more generally, what differentiates government
decisions that receive greater judicial scrutiny from those that get less. The term is meant
to serve as an abbreviated reference to the mixture of doctrines governing such
distinctions in the strictness of review applied to an agency’s factual or prescriptive
conclusions in a given decision. Stringency includes, among other things, the standard of
review governing appeals of specific administrative actions. It is affected by the degree
of outright deference given to the executive branch, and the extent to which courts find
through constitutional or statutory interpretation that a particular decision to be
committed by law to agency discretion. More stringency can imply more rigorous
procedures (such as those that might be imposed on due process groups) that the
government must follow before imposing a cost on someone, a less permissive standard
of review for the factual findings of executive branch agencies (or lower courts), and less
overall deference to the government’s decision itself.
Thus, when a court determines that a six-page declaration from an official
ensconced beneath layers of the Defense Department bureaucracy is enough reason to
detain someone for an indefinite period of time, it is being more deferential.74 When a
court decides such justification is insufficient, because the executive must provide a
“meaningful opportunity” for someone so designated to get notice of the factual basis for
their detention and to contest their status, it is being less deferential.75 When a court says
that a person cannot be detained (given the legislature’s current authorization) unless
someone is charged with a crime, it is auguring to provide review that is even more
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For cases, see supra note 6.
Indeed, casual observers may be forgiven for assuming (heroically) that courts (or legislatures, when they
directly impose limits on review) are balancing the marginal costs and benefits of greater stringency of
review. See infra Part I.c.ii for a discussion.
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stringent.76 Though specific cases may involve different doctrinal bases and legal
subtleties, the important distinction is not in the specific doctrines or procedures
involved. It is in the fact that under a standard of greater deference, whether caused by
legislative enactments or subsequent judicial interpretation, some executive bureaucracy
retains greater power to decide how to use its discretion.
Decisions about review stringency, moreover, follow a certain convention. When
deciding how much of that power to let executive authorities keep, courts and legislators
tend to implicitly assume that a particular degree of stringency in review will apply, once
articulated (and assuming it is actually followed) across the board to all similarly-situated
cases.77 In fact courts treat horizontal equity as an important value, where deviations
must be defended.78 The same goes for virtually all the legislative mandates that courts
implement. The move to privilege horizontal equity in judicial review is the essence of
traditional judicial review.79 Its rationale may be grounded in an appreciation for stare
decisis, or perhaps resides in an inflated conception of judicial power to ensure that like
cases are treated similarly. Predictably, the desire for horizontal equity in standards
governing the stringency of review renders troubling (at least in the eyes of many
principled observers) the prospect of increasing the stringency of review in a particular
case. A decision to increase review stringency in a single case is taken to cast a long
shadow on all similar decisions in the relevant pool of cases, and prohibitively increasing
the associated costs in terms of the direct burdens of review and the forgone benefits of
discretion.
C. Audits Can Substitute For, or Supplement, Judicial Review
Suppose now that those allegedly prohibitive costs, or their related administrative
complications, preclude extensive supervision of executive discretion through judicial
review. To fill the gap, some observers may rely on heroic conceptions of the political
process, or the media. But each of these mechanisms depends in large measure on
information about the nature and quality of executive decisionmaking. Politicians and
76

No doubt the decision to require a criminal charge in such a context affects more than just how judicial
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involves the role of court review.
77
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the media sometimes have reason to generate that information through investigations that
may turn up some potentially useful tidbit of executive malfeasance (from their
perspective). There is no compelling reason to think that these erstwhile investigators
will routinely face sufficient incentives to investigate, which is why observers assign
such relative importance to judicial review as a means of generating information with the
potential to provoke political and journalistic responses.80 Even the otherwise laudable
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is no reliable bulwark against bureaucratic
misconduct. Such misconduct may afflict responses to FOIA requests in ways that are
difficult for courts to monitor, and the law itself is riddled with exceptions.81 How else
might legislators and the public undertake such supervision?
i. Envisioning the Institutional Design of Audits of Executive Discretion
One answer can be found in what government organizations repeatedly do to the
public: they audit. By thinking about alternative institutional arrangements, such as
audits, it may possible to glean a better sense of the practical and political opportunities
to nudge bureaucracies with discretionary legal powers away from failure. Audits are not
the only means of generating information about the exercise of discretion.82 Nonetheless,
as will become clear, the exercise of designing an audit system also serves to clarify the
consequentialist goals that are supposed to be served when discretion is reviewed.
As the term is used here, an audit of executive discretion is a sustained, careful
evaluation of a discrete decision drawn from a larger pool. Its aim is to uncover, for each
reviewed case, whether a particular discretionary decision is in accord with some
defensible standard grounded in public representations of the executive branch, implicit
in statutes or constitutional doctrine, or defined by the auditor in advance. In contrast to
financial or more wide-ranging management audits, the audits of targeted executive
discretion I discuss below treat each discretionary decision, like a decision to label a
group as a specially designated terrorist organization, as the unit of analysis. Audits of
executive discretion would evaluate the information supporting the decision, its origins
and reliability, contradictory information, and the broader context in which the decision
took place. Even in instances where the population of cases from which a sample could
be drawn is relatively small, audits have the potential to “increase the information
extracted from [an organization’s] own limited historical experience, by treating unique
historical incidents as detailed stories rather than single data points.”83 Though existing
audits rarely take precisely the form I suggest here, the basic idea of using audits to learn
what’s going on in the world is neither mysterious nor rare.
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Audits associated with taxation are among the most familiar. They take place in
some form in most reliable tax collection systems.84 Many tax audits are not entirely
random, which reduces their ability to provide a reliable picture of public behavior. The
less random the audits are, the less generalizable their results – and the easier it might be
to evade them by avoiding the behaviors that raise the probability of being audited.85
From this perspective, one of the “purest” tax auditing programs in recent years (in the
sense of being almost entirely random) was the Internal Revenue Service’s Taxpayer
Compliance Measurement Program (or TCMP). The following discussion emphasizes
the tremendous informational value of such a program:
The last thorough tax gap study was for the year 1992, based on the 1988 TCMP.
Noncompliance with individual and corporate income taxes was estimated to cost
the Treasury about 18 percent of actual tax liability, which at 2002 levels of
revenue would have amounted to $223 billion. An average tax rate of 22 percent
implies that there is about $1 trillion of unreported income and illegitimate
deductions.86
Without TCMP audits, the federal government is unable to figure out the size of the “tax
gap.” The program’s cancellation has limited the government’s ability to know how
much is paid relative to what is owed, and who is particularly likely to be responsible for
that gap.87
Audits also show up in the pages of court opinions. Suppose federal health care
regulators and investigators suspect a health care clinic or nursing home of overcharging
the federal government on Medicare payments. The government sends in investigators.
Instead of figuring out the amount the clinic owes by reviewing each one of its files,
investigators occasionally use audits to calculate the amount.88 Courts reviewing this
practice have repeatedly endorsed it, finding neither a conflict with the statute nor one
with due process.89 “Sample audits” also make an occasional appearance in class actions.
When they do, courts (and litigants) confronted with an entire class of claims take a
sample of those claims to get a better sense of what’s going on.90
Something similar happens in the private sector, where “your call may be
monitored for quality assurance.” The point of such audits is not immediately to stop
abuses or mistakes in discrete cases. It is to enable greater learning about happens to the
hundreds or thousands of individuals interacting with a company’s workers, and how
those interactions can be improved. Insurance companies sometimes perform a process
of “closed file review,” where they spend more money figuring out whether the amount
84
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of money paid out for a particular insurance claim was correctly calculated than they do
paying out the claim itself.91 It is not difficult to see why managers would rather know
more about how their employees are performing. Nor is it surprising that random audits
(at least when they happen with a sufficiently high probability) make it harder for the
people or organizations being overseen to evade detection.92
Private sector employers value audits for a reason. Audits mitigate the problem,
common to public agencies regulating private behavior, of learning how individuals are
actually functioning in an inherently complex and unpredictable environment. Indeed, if
regulators avoided random auditing techniques altogether, they would face at least two
problems. Existing knowledge about where problems lie may prove deficient or
outdated. Perhaps more important, strategic actors can simply evade review by avoiding
domains where enforcement is already occurring. This is why the Supreme Court lauded
random enforcement in United States v. Biswell.93 One afternoon, a pawn shop owner
who was federally licensed to deal in sporting firearms was surprised to find a Treasury
agent arrive to inspect the premises. In holding that the Treasury agent could do so
without a warrant, the majority observed that:
[I]f inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent, unannounced,
even frequent, inspections are essential. In this context, the prerequisite of a
warrant could easily frustrate inspection; and if the necessary flexibility as to
time, scope, and frequency is to be preserved, the protections afforded by a
warrant would be negligible.94
Not surprisingly, the federal government has created several bureaucracies
capable of using audit-type techniques to investigate what government agencies actually
do with their discretion. Occasionally, government agencies audit the performance of
their own workers.95 The Government Accountability Office (originally the General
th
Accounting Office, or GAO) was created early in the 20 century primarily to help
Congress monitor the financial activities of the executive branch.96 In 1974, legislators
gave the GAO power to review and analyze the implementation of government programs.
Shortly thereafter, beginning in the middle of the 1970s and continuing over the next ten
years or so, legislators began creating “Inspector General” offices in the federal
government.97 Like the GAO, the Inspectors General have the legal power to investigate
how federal officials use their targeted discretion. The existence of these structures
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indicates the potentially important role that audits can play in shaping how the federal
government uses its targeted discretion. Whether these bureaucracies actually perform
such audits is another matter, discussed below.98
To understand how audits of executive discretion would work, imagine a world
much like our own, where only some decisions are subject to stringent judicial review,
and others are subject to less stringent review. For fairly obvious reasons, political
principals (to use the parlance of game theory) desire to know how the government is
using its discretion. But constraints exist in the form of a limited budget to review
decisions, and concerns about over-deterring the executive branch. Earlier I noted that a
key feature of judicial review is that courts and legislators tend to pick a standard of
deference that’s supposed to apply to all cases in a particular class. What audits do is to
introduce an alternative means of review that allows for variation in both the standard of
deference used to review cases as well as the number of cases actually reviewed. In
exchange for reviewing fewer cases, whoever is conducting the audits can demand more
evidence from the executive branch, more justification, and more access to information –
all at a lower cost than what would be incurred if the same standard of deference applied
to every decision.99
The process would unfold along the following lines. First, an auditor would
define some discrete set of targeted decisions to analyze (i.e., all summary exclusions at
the border, all enemy combatant designations, all occupational safety administrative
compliance orders, or all decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute case referrals from
law enforcement agencies regarding mail fraud). Second, the auditor would randomly
choose some number or percentage of decisions to audit. Third, those decisions would be
reviewed far more stringently than a court would review the full potential class of
decisions. If a court (as with border inspection decisions) provides almost no review, the
auditor would gather all available information about how the decision took place, what its
effect was, what the secondary inspector knew when he denied entry, and what other
agencies know that might be relevant to the decision. If a court reviews IEEPA
designations under a highly permissive version of the “arbitrary and capricious” and
“substantial evidence” tests, the auditor would instead gather information on how an
administrative record was complied – not just on what it purports to say. In doing this,
the auditor would apply some kind of standard (which I discuss below) either drawn from
the purposes of the statutes in question, or perhaps even based on what the executive
branch says it is trying to accomplish through its actions (for instance, in the criminal
context, the auditor’s determination of a standard would be shaped by statements of
prosecutors regarding the purposes that prosecutions). Fourth, the results of the audit
would be made available to legislators and the public, a development that could (under
certain conditions) help pressure the agency to make modifications in its conduct.
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Intelligence information could be used in these determinations because it can be reviewed
in camera.100
Admittedly, the effect of this institutional mechanism depends on whether
legislators and the public react to the audits. While both might sometimes ignore those
results, the media’s reaction to GAO and Inspector General reports suggests that audits
could prove to be salient.101 Judicial review would continue in the background at
whatever standard of deference courts and legislatures choose. Judges might even
evaluate executive clamoring for deference by weighing whether a reliable audit system
is in place, and in others courts might approach their cases differently as a result of what
the audits revealed. Although audits would not necessarily provide relief to every
aggrieved person or group, they would help legislators, organized interest groups, and the
public to learn far more about what government does than is currently known.102
ii. Trading Off Breadth Against Depth Assuming Marginal Cost Analysis
The potential value of audits is readily apparent if one makes the heroic
assumption that elaborate analyses of marginal costs and benefits in fact determine
standards of stringency governing a pool of potential cases. Assume for a moment,
therefore, that legislators and courts have appropriately weighed the costs and benefits of
reviewing a certain kind of decision at a particular degree of stringency. They have
decided, for example, that orders freezing assets should get nothing more than highly
deferential arbitrary and capricious review. Even if conscientious courts and legislators
think of this degree of stringency as the best way to strike a balance among competing
concerns, they may still recognize that there is an unfortunate by-product of this choice of
stringency level. Specifically, some types of errors associated with these decisions can
only be detected if review is more stringent than at present. When people engage in
deliberate wrongs, for example, they tend to make efforts to hide their misconduct. In
effect, the function mapping stringency of review to probability of detecting mistakes or
manipulation can be radically discontinuous, in which case it may be better to manage the
costs of review by reviewing fewer cases more thoroughly. It is precisely the trade-off
social scientists make when they consider whether to allocate scarce resources to getting
a larger sample or to investigate their cases more profoundly,103 and that courts
themselves occasionally make when they take cautiously use samples of claims in a class,
or health care reimbursement requests to learn more in the litigation process.104
Of course, audits introduce their own costs into the equation. While fixing the
precise cost of an audit system depends on institutional design issues taken up in Part II,
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there is good reason to expect that those costs would be lower than those associated with
an expansion in the availability or stringency of traditional judicial review. For one, the
costs of audits are “scalable,” such that we can audit a smaller proportion of cases if the
costs are perceived as being too high, then the proportion of cases that are audited could
be reduced. If one takes the language of judicial opinions and briefs (particularly from the
government) seriously when they discuss the appropriate stringency of review. Beyond
the reflexive invocation of precedent, there appears to be a consequentialist concern
about how review at a particular degree of stringency will generate costs. Presumably
those costs would be less – even if we kept the potential remedy – if only one of the
whole universe of potential cases were audited, or two or three out of a pool of hundreds
or thousands. If one takes the language from the judicial process seriously, a logical
implication seems to be that reviewing all potential cases is more costly than reviewing
some fraction of them. Moreover, audits would not necessarily yield a direct remedy.105
To the extent that analyses of the marginal costs and benefits of review incorporate the
possible costs to the executive branch of having a decision vacated by a court, then audits
would also involve lower costs because they can be designed merely to reveal
information rather than to provide direct relief.
iii. Alternative Assumptions: Separate Informational and Cost Aspirations
While painstaking analysis of marginal costs and benefits may amount to a
compelling prescription for deciding on stringency of review, such an analysis is almost
certainly a far-fetched description of how courts and legislatures actually make decisions.
Instead, as policymakers weigh the consequences of discretion, they almost certainly
recognize that various actors -- from government actors, to directly aggrieved parties, to
the public at large – are likely to bear different burdens, and may reap quite different
rewards, from the review of discretionary decisions. This complicates marginal cost
analysis in a host of predictable ways. In the absence of far more precise moral or
analytical guidance than currently exists, courts and legislatures may find it nearly
intractable to ask (for instance) how many mistaken enemy combatant designations are
worth tolerating in exchange for a given marginal increase in security that is allegedly
only possible if some proportion of mistaken designations is tolerated.106
Given these difficulties, one might therefore use a different metaphor to describe
the work of principled courts and legislatures when they make decisions about the proper
stringency of review. One might imagine that society (through its courts and legislatures)
makes two initially separate calculations when deciding on how to review decisions. One
sets an aspiration that a given review procedure (such as judicial review) not exceed a
105
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maximum acceptable total cost. And another sets an aspiration regarding the minimum
acceptable probability that a problem (whether an innocent mistake or a willful
manipulation) will be discovered in the average reviewed case.
A simple model helps illustrate the potential differences between audits and
traditional judicial review in a world where society sets such separate informational and
cost aspirations. Begin by accepting the executive branch’s premise that more intrusive
judicial review is a problem because it inordinately raises the cost of review associated
with the average case, with cost here referring to the whole gamut of allegedly adverse
consequences associated with grater review stringency. This suggests (plausibly enough)
that there is a relationship between the stringency of judicial review and the total cost of
reviewing instances where executive discretion is used. In this context, the reference to
cost implicates several factors. We should expect that the more cases reviewed, the
higher is the direct cost incurred by the court (or some other reviewing authority) when
examining cases, and by the executive branch when providing information and defending
its actions on an individual case. Moreover, the more cases reviewed (or at least eligible
for review) out of a total pool of cases, the more that the benefits of targeted discretion
might dissipate. Decisions may be slower (either because of the resources consumed by
the review process, or simply because the fact they will be reviewed leads the executive
branch to make the initial determination more judiciously). The risk of over-deterring
may also be greater as the proportion of cases eligible for review rises towards 100%. On
the other hand, more stringent review is valuable because it is more likely to reveal
problems in discretionary decisions.
To illustrate the situation, let the terms Cd and Ci denote direct and indirect costs,
respectively, of reviewing cases with a particular degree of stringency. Let Pr( ) denote
the probability that a problem is discovered in an average case given a particular degree
of stringency in the review process, which is represented by an increasing parameter S
that begins at zero and increases to 1, which represents maximally intrusive review. Let
Nc denote the proportion of cases reviewed in a given class of cases. And imagine that
the following plausible conditions hold:
•

Cd and Ci increase as a linear function of S, such that C=Cd + Ci and C=f(S), such
that one can define a two dimensional space consisting of a cost dimension C
running vertically, and a perpendicular stringency of review dimension S running
horizontally.

•

For any given set of cases that are reviewed with a particular degree of stringency,
both Cd and Ci increase as Nc increases. This implies that the slope of the line
defining the relationship between S and C becomes more elastic as the proportion
of cases reviewed decreases.

•

Pr( ) increases as a linear function of S associated with some minimum number of
cases reviewed, such that one can also define a two dimensional space consisting
of a probability of discovering problems dimension Pr( ), and a precisely
orthogonal stringency of review dimension S.

•

At some levels of stringency, the probability of discovering problems falls below
the social aspiration for an acceptable minimum (where “acceptable minimum”
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means the point below which, according to a social consensus, the probability of
discovering problems should not fall). There is a unique point on the S dimension
(call it Smin), indicating the minimum acceptable degree of stringency.
•

For any given Nc, there is some point Cmax representing the social aspiration for the
maximum cost of review that society is willing to bear for a given method of
reviewing executive discretion. Because C increases as a function S, Cmax
corresponds to a maximum degree of stringency of review (call thisS max).
Figure 1: Discretion and Traditional Judicial Review (Total Review Cost Versus
Stringency in the Average Case Reviewed)
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Figure 1 shows how these factors can interact in situations where separate goals
have been set for managing the total cost of review and the probability of discovering
problems in the average reviewed case, and judicial review is nonetheless likely to work
reasonably well. Any point on the horizontal stringency axis (at the top and bottom of
the figure) would have corresponding points, indicating the total cost of that degree of
stringency and its associated probability of discovering problems in the average case, on
the two perpendicular axes. The upper part of the figure shows the relationship between
the total costs of review and stringency for cases reviewed. The cost-stringency line has
roughly the same slope as the probability-stringency line in the lower figure, which
indicates the relationship between stringency and the probability of discovering problems
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in an average case.107 The space between the lowest acceptable bound of review (Smin)
and the highest permissible cost (which corresponds to Smax) is what might be called the
“feasible review set.” This is the space where courts (or legislators) have some flexibility
in setting the stringency of the doctrine. Any level of stringency lower than Smin means
there will not be a high enough probability of discovering problems, and a level higher
than Smax effectively breaks the bank – either because the review process itself becomes
too expensive or because of there is too much interference with the benefits of discretion
in the executive branch.108

Figure 2: How Greater Stringency Can Be Achieved in the Average Audited
Case (Total Review Cost Versus Stringency in the Average Case Reviewed)
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Switch now from thinking about judicial review to thinking about audits, and a
subtle but important difference emerges in the situation. Because we have assumed that
the relationship between C and S becomes more elastic for an average case as the
proportion of cases reviewed decreases, then audits allow a higher degree of stringency
of review (and thereby a lower standard of deference) for the same cost. Figure 2 shows
107
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how this looks. In contrast with Figure 1, the slope of the cost-stringency line is now
flatter than that of the probability-stringency line in the lower portion of the figure.109
Now the feasible review set suddenly expands dramatically while the costs of review
remain the same. The implication is that, in exchange for lower costs by reviewing a
smaller proportion of cases, the auditor gains the chance to review cases more thoroughly
– to ask for more evidence, to require a more explicit showing of facts in a record, to
inquire into how a particular record was developed, and ultimately, to better understand
what the pressures may have affected the decisionmaker and distorted her decision. What
both Figures 1 and 2 have in common, nonetheless, is that the decisionmaker (whether a
reviewing court or an auditor) can choose a level of stringency above Smin – that is, above
the level of stringency associated with the minimum socially-acceptable probability of
discovering problems. Although this is being achieved for only a proportion of cases (in
Figure 2), the information produced about that subset of cases is vastly more valuable
(assuming the particular conditions) than what is learned from the essentially rubberstamp review of every decision.110
The preceding discussion highlights two major differences between audits and
traditional forms of judicial review. The costs of audits can be adjusted by changing the
number of cases reviewed, not just the stringency of that review. In addition, audits
would not reflect the distortions imposed by the litigation process. The cases reviewed
would not be a function of who can obtain representation or what particular fact pattern
entices judicial attention. As explained below, both of these characteristics turn out to be
important in making the case for supplementing judicial review with audits of executive
discretion.
D. Why Traditional Judicial Review Suffers From Limitations
So far the argument has proceeded by showing how audits can substitute some of
the functions associated with judicial review. The properties associated with audit
review, moreover, can avoid certain distortions common to the judicial process. But the
value of such properties cannot be appreciated in the abstract. To better understand such
review’s merits as a way of overseeing executive discretion, we must review some of the
costs and benefits of deviating from the conventional limited-discretion baseline
discussed above. This entails a careful accounting of the alleged value of robust
executive power in the absence of judicial scrutiny, along with an evaluation of the
process that may undermine desirable bureaucratic behavior when the executive branch
has been entrusted with such additional discretion. Such analyses make it easier to
appreciate the strength of the case for auditing executive discretion, and the concomitant
problems associated with a world devoid of audits.
i. Reviewing Rationales for Departing From a Limited-Discretion Baseline.
Given the allegedly intimate link between accountability and court review,
departures from a baseline of stringent review presumably should be contingent on a
satisfactory accounting of the benefits from such a move. So what are the benefits? A
fairly obvious one is speed, or what is commonly termed “efficiency.” Some decisions
109
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need to be made quickly if they’re going to matter. Suppose policymakers confront a
possible outbreak of avian flu virus. They may consider imposing a quarantine. They
must decide quickly whether American airports will receive flights from the affected
country. To delay the decision effectively becomes a decision to let the planes land.
Even if it is possible to wait, it may cost a lot to do so. The Treasury can wait to freeze a
suspicious charity’s assets, but those assets may soon leave the group’s coffers for some
tropical island bank secrecy haven. Letting executive authorities have discretion lets
them not only decide quickly – and the saved time can translate into money, extra safety,
and convenience. The point is not lost on courts reviewing many of the federal
government’s national security decisions.111 Nor is it lost on courts and scholars writing
about other aspects of public law – such as those concerned about the “ossification” of
regulatory rules.112 On a related note, less review also saves two kinds of resources:
those the court or other reviewing authority would expend on analyzing a case, and those
that the government would spend defending itself. These costs are likely to be especially
salient because courts, relying on some version of stare decisis or horizontal equity
norms, assume they are fashioning a standard that will apply to all (or nearly all) similar
cases.113
The argument for discretion in such cases often exalts the centrality of
expertise.114 The conventional wisdom is that agencies and the executive branch have
greater specialized technical competence than the judges who might review their
decisions. Given its perceived intellectual pedigree, this justification recurs in judicial
decisions in a wide range of domains, regardless of whether the subject is medical
evaluation of disability claims, military planning, or evaluation of chemical data.115 No
doubt that expertise is valuable. The more some reviewing authority intervenes, the
greater the risk that expert decisions will be undone. More intervention may even dilute
the incentives of decisionmakers to develop and use expertise, or innovate in desirable
ways that may not immediately inspire public confidence.116 Discretion may also have a
role in helping government harmonize competing goals, trading off some desired goals
against further delays (for example) in achieving policy objectives considered less
compelling.117
In the same vein, supporters of executive discretion accept bold suppositions
about executive branch accountability to bolster their case. Accountability is surely a
contestable and often ambiguous concept. But scholarly references to it appear to
encompass, at a minimum, the idea that the public should be able to assign responsibility
for government decisions and to force decisionmakers to bear a cost when those decisions
are not acceptable. In an ironic twist, the rhetoric of accountability that so often bolsters
arguments for stringent judicial review sometimes serves precisely the opposite goal.
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The argument proceeds along the following lines. The less that court (or other external)
intervention encroaches on the executive’s domain, the more that legislators, organized
interest groups and the larger public can focus on rewarding or punishing the executive
(or the inferior officer) for her decisions.118 This position implies not only a reluctance to
see courts throw sand in the gears of some hypothetical scheme for accountability, but a
confidence that an accounting will indeed be rendered to either superior officers or the
public. Thus courts observe (as did this one in declining to engage in review of
prosecutorial discretion) that “while this discretion is subject to abuse or misuse just as is
judicial discretion, deviations from [the prosecutor’s] duty as an agent of the Executive
are to be dealt with by his superiors.”119
ii. Why Bureaucracies Granted Discretion Fail (to Learn).
The arguments extolling discretion each have a grain of truth. What they do not
address is how much – and how easily – discretion can be abused, whether the context is
social security benefit payments, border screening, enemy combatant designations, or
prosecutorial enforcement. Consider, for example, what could be called the “learning
costs” problem. Executive branch bureaucracies and the people who work in them spend
their days (ostensibly) carrying out legal mandates. People who work there do that in
part by relying on expertise. They hone that expertise by learning from their
environment, and correcting their mistakes. But if no external authority monitors the
bureaucracy, then those who work there may be unwilling or unable to learn much of
anything. In fact, several scholars have suggested that external court review helps
bureaucratic institutions learn. But that belief is not always fully explained, and court
review carries concomitant risks of over-deterring executive branch activity. No doubt
sometimes an inspector’s good conscience or an agency’s strong internal culture
contribute to reasonable decisions about what assets to freeze or who should be labeled
an enemy combatant. Nonetheless, it is certainly plausible to assume that such desirable
circumstances do not always arise, and that judicial review helps create conditions that
foster learning.
Four separate but interrelated reasons support this claim. First, a substantial body
of research suggests that people learn when they have reason to do so.120 Other things
being equal, the dilution of review may deprive individuals in public bureaucracies of
reasons to learn (at least, limits on review may disrupt public officials’ incentives to learn
with the same intensity than they would if review were more stringent). This assumes,
quite plausibly, that a review process turning up mistakes can be embarrassing to people,
or that people in the agency may otherwise suffer some costs if they face some kind of
review process that does not go well.121 Second, organizations develop routines that
blind them. As Diane Vaughan wrote in her study of the Challengerlaunch decision:
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Possibly the most significant lesson from the Challenger case is how
environmental and organizational contingencies create prerational forces that
shape worldview, normalizing signals of potential danger, resulting in mistakes
with harmful human consequences. The explanation of the Challengerlaunch is a
story of how people who worked together developed patterns that blinded them to
the consequences of their actions. It is not only about the development of norms
but about the incremental expansion of normative boundaries: how small changes
– new behaviors that were slight deviations from the normal course of events –
gradually became the norm, providing a basis for accepting additional deviance.
No rules were violated; there was no intent to do harm. Yet harm was done.122
[Emphasis added].
External review may elucidate things that people inside the organization fail to
appreciate. Outsiders may see things not despite, but precisely because of, the absence of
expertise. Which means that even if discretion plays a vital role in creating the incentives
for people to gather expertise and for other reasons discussed previously, its abundance
may diminish opportunities for learning from mistaken enemy combatant designations,
border inspection decisions, asset freezing determinations, and health or safety
inspections. The most attractive kinds of organizational learning – where the
organization learns to achieve important goals better and more efficiently – is likely to be
rarely encountered, if in fact it is encountered at all.123 Watering down or forgoing
judicial review altogether leaves the problem of how agencies will learn from their
mistakes, and indeed, how agencies will even realize that they have made a mistake.124
Large grants of discretion can have at least two other problematic consequences.
In some cases, executive branch officials may succumb to the temptation to use their
discretion to create an appealing impression among the public. I discuss this problem at
greater length elsewhere,125 but the basic insight is a simple one. Executive authorities
face fewer checks in the domain of discretionary action than in traditional regulatory or
criminal justice realms. Accordingly, discretionary actions can serve as a sort of signal
that the public (or political superiors) can use in forming judgments about the
competence of the executive branch (or an organization within it). As long as the
public’s impressions of the executive branch’s expertise, success, ability, and resolve are
influenced in part by discretionary actions, then those actions will become tempting
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levers to create favorable public perceptions. Frozen assets and specially-designated
terrorist organizations send the message that the executive branch knows what it’s doing.
It may not. This state of affairs may skew citizens’ ability to evaluate the effectiveness of
their own government. And the discretionary actions may themselves have costs,
including the creation of perverse incentives for regulated groups,126 diminished
compliance with treaties, or simply the individual mistreatment suffered by individual
detainees (for example) whose weeks as enemy combatants became months and then
years before ending (at least for some) in freedom. There is, finally, the specter of more
deliberate transgressions. Just as discretion allows political authorities to engage in
subtle, politically-motivated self-dealing, it can also lead to some employees engaging in
blatant, willful malfeasance.127
When stalwart defenders of executive discretion come close to acknowledging
these realities, their most frequent move is to invoke a political process that is rarely
expressly defined. They are obviously right to recognize how public organizations exist
in a larger political context. But assuming that such a context will reliably and
consistently counterbalance the tendencies I’ve just described requires accepting heroic
assumptions. Even if voters often behaved relatively rationally as the term is
conventionally understood in modern political science, the results of the political game
are endogenous to the information available. Agency relationships change in response to
what the players come to know, even if – to paraphrase Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld – voters know what they do not know.128
A more plausible assumption can be grounded in the extensive behavioral
th
research tradition in mid-to-late 20 century political science, suggesting that voters often
do not know what they do not know.129 One might even question the electorate’s
distribution of its scarce cognitive attention, as there is no particularly good reason to
think that voters come to focus on the facets of law or policy that they should even if we
use their own consistently expressed and stable values as a benchmark.130 These
limitations constrain the electorate’s capacity to provide a bulwark against bureaucratic
failure. And they explain, among other things, why legislators themselves often do just
fine not only if they ignore festering problems of bureaucratic competence,131 but if they
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deliberately create them.132 The point is not that electoral checks are irrelevant. It’s that
they’re not entirely reliable, and they are often dependent on some mechanism – like
judicial review – to focus public attention and produce information for it.
E. How Audits Can Ameliorate the Limitations of Traditional Judicial Review.
The preceding discussion implies that bureaucracies should frequently be
expected to face pressures to render poor decisions, unless they are subjected to
constraints that judge them in promising directions. Those constraints depend, in turn, on
the public availability of information about bureaucratic performance. Once the
executive discretion problem is thus recast, it becomes plain how audits can often
generate such valuable information. If the costs of review only apply to a small fraction
of cases, then marginal cost analysis permits more stringent review of that random subset
of cases. Willful malfeasance will be harder to conceal, and (more generally) mistakes
that would simply not appear under deferential judicial review may emerge, regardless of
whether they involve compliance orders, passenger prescreening procedures, or other
forms of administrative action.133
But an even more striking rationale for audits emerges if we imagine that courts
and legislators are not precisely balancing marginal costs and benefits when deciding
how to review executive discretion. Return instead to the possibility that legislators and
courts are instead trying to negotiate the difficult terrain created by inconsistent social
aspirations. What happens if a reasonable amount of review is simultaneously
prohibitively expensive and extremely valuable? Lawyers may seem to be talking past
each other in such a scenario, and judicial review itself may be condemned to fail because
the costs of review make the socially desired degree of stringency for reviewed cases
appear too expensive. Such costs may arise from the resource burdens directly associated
with the provision of review, from increases in the probability of interference with
desirable executive branch activity, or from the resources necessary for the executive to
respond to judicial proceedings. Figure 3 indicates the problem. It depicts a situation
where the curve depicting the relationship of stringency of review to costs of review (i.e.,
the cost-stringency function) actually looks quite different from the curve depicting the
relationship between stringency of review and the probability of uncovering mistakes
(i.e., probability-stringency function).
Suppose, for example, that the first function is a linear one, just as in Figures 1
and 2. Stringency pushes up the cost of review in a constant fashion. More stringent
review means more time spent adjudicating disputes about executive discretion, more
executive branch resources spent resolving those disputes, and a greater probability that
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review will render decisions about freezing assets or administrative compliance orders
unworkable. But (as the lower portions of Figure 3 indicate) imagine that the relationship
between stringency of review and the probability of discovering problems is starkly
discontinuous. That is – a substantial increase in the stringency of review yields a very
small appreciable benefit in terms of Pr ( ), even though the cost is still increasing in a
linear fashion as the stringency does. Then suddenly there is a substantial increase. This
sort of relationship might describe situations where most of the problems affecting
targeted discretionary decisions involve complicated willful malfeasance (such as TSA
officials trying to cover up problems with how they put names on a “no-fly” list). It
might also describe instances where bureaucratic requirements appear to have been
followed on paper, but where, in fact, those requirements are not actually followed.134 In
such cases, it is likely that problems could only be detected with a decidedly more
exacting brand of review.
Now imagine juxtaposing this situation with a social aspiration for a relatively
low total cost (Smax), which is what the court may set if the decision has to do with
national security. And notice what this does to the feasible review set. It disappears,
leaving the reviewing court with no way to simultaneously achieve social aspirations
regarding the maximum total cost of review and the minimum acceptable probability of
discovering problems for a reviewed case. This implies that at least in some instances
where targeted discretion is used, there may be no feasible review set, because the cost of
reviewing discretionary decisions at the level of stringency necessary to actually have a
credible chance of detecting problems far exceeds the maximum socially-acceptable cost
of review.
Things look a different if we use audits instead of traditional judicial review. The
right side of Figure 3 tells the story. As with Figure 2, the slope of the cost-stringency
line is flatter (more elastic), which leads to a higher stringency of review for any given
cost that is paid for review. The number of decisions reviewed is also smaller. But in
many domains, it seems plausible that greater stringency for a smaller number of
decisions would tend to be associated with a higher comparative probability of detecting
problems than lower stringency for a larger number of decisions. Such a trade-off might
be especially worth making, for example, when the total number of decisions rendered is
relatively smaller than in other domains (thereby making a small number of audited
decisions into a larger proportion of the total decisions), or when the soundness of a
decision depends not on what an administrative record says but on how the record was
gathered. In situations where the stringency increase possible from reviewing fewer
cases yields such a greater probability of uncovering problems, the result of using audits
creates the possibility of a small feasible review set where there was none before –
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enough room for the auditor to avoid exceeding the maximum cost yet to still have a
reasonable opportunity to detect problems afflicting discretionary decisions.

Figure 3: Instances Where Judicial Review “Fails” in the Average Case
(Where Society Generates Separate Informational and Cost Aspirations)

Judicial Review
(No feasible review set!)
A. Stringency
and total review
cost

C

Audits
(Cost grows more
slowly as stringency
grows)
C

S
B. Stringency
and informational benefit in
the average
reviewed case

Pr(¹ )

S

Pr(¹ )

S

S

The value of that error detection mechanism would also lie in the more
representative picture of bureaucratic behavior it might yield. By its nature, litigation
produces a biased sample. The cases we learn about are the ones that get litigated, and
under various plausible conditions those cases are not the only ones likely to involve
valid claims.135 As Bill Simon has pointed out in the welfare context, for example, this
pattern can gradually distort public perceptions of a policy’s strengths and weaknesses by
focusing attention on only one aspect of an administrative system’s problems (e.g.,
underpayments, rather than overpayments).136 In contrast, audits have the potential to
generate information regardless of the willingness or opportunity of individuals to
challenge specific decisions.
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While the preceding features are likely to render audits quite valuable, two
caveats are in order at this point. First, the argument thus far tenders audits as a
conceptual alternative to judicial review, not as a wholesale replacement of it. Its
principal contention is that we should consider the implications of policing discretion
through audits instead of through judicial review, which I’ve characterized as a form of
supervision premised on applying the same degree of stringency to every case in a given
class. This does not imply that audits should generally replace traditional judicial review
as an exclusive means of overseeing executive discretion. Judicial review obviously
serves a host of important functions, of which producing information about the
performance and reasonableness of public bureaucracies making discretionary decisions
is only one. Litigation harnesses the intricate machinery of adjudicatory bureaucracy to
articulate and clarify legal norms in the context of specific cases. It can vindicate the
interests of people who are legally and morally entitled to a proverbial “day,” in court, or
to a set of special remedies for which litigation is the best rationing device.137
Second, the belief that audits can deliver the aforementioned benefits depends on
making certainassumptions about the powers of the auditor, though none are particularly
implausible. Specifically, the auditor needs to be in a better position to discover
problems in the use of targeted discretion than the bureaucracy being reviewed. In this
context, the reference to “better position” implies at least three qualities: (a) that the
auditor is motivated to discover problems (and not to exaggerate them), thereby avoiding
some of the willful malfeasance and politically-oriented self-dealing problems that
bureaucracies have because of their political context; (b) that the auditor has sufficient
abilities to evaluate the discretionary decision, perhaps in part through reference to some
explicit or implicit standard of what is expected from such decisions; and (c) that the
auditor is at least somewhat better than the decisionmakers being reviewed at avoiding
some of the more subtle mistakes that afflict discretionary decisionmaking. Tempting as
it may be to collapse these conditions into an “expertise” parameter, it’s important to
recognize that expertise (in addition to being a far more ambiguous term than is often
recognized) is a dangerously seductive yet potentially quite dangerous two-edged sword:
what makes some bureaucratic decisionmakers blind to the complexities of the problems
they face is precisely their expertise in defining those problems in a standard, predictable
fashion that often turns out to be wrong.138 Nonetheless, the auditor(s) must know
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something about what constitutes accuracy when allegedly terrorist assets are frozen or
when agencies use administrative compliance orders.139 Whether it is possible to
generate this and other conditions depends in large measure on how to resolve questions
about the details of the institutional design addressed below.
II.
WHY THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN PROBLEMS INHERENT IN AUDITS ARE MANAGEABLE
A. Audits Can Be Adapted to Address Multiple Forms of Discretion
As Kenneth C. Davis recognized a generation ago, government authorities are
flush with power to make highly informal decisions affecting people, where “the usual
quality of justice” may be quite low.140 Such discretion, showcased in the preceding
discussion, may often involve specific, targeted decisions whose primary effect is on
specific individuals and groups.141 This type of discretionary power government officials
possess to freeze allegedly terrorist assets, place someone on a government-run “no-fly”
list, or levy certain environmental or occupational safety fines could be called “targeted
discretion.” Similar decisions involve bureaucracies applying some implicit or explicit
legal standard, often in combination with some sort of policy basis (i.e., “enemy
combatants are dangerous terrorists, many of them linked to Al-Qaeda”) that the
executive branch itself has articulated as a rationale for these decisions.142 Because of
their frequency and their impact on discrete individuals and groups, targeted discretionary
decisions are most immediately suitable for audits.
Targeted executive discretion stands in contrast to broader policy judgments.
Those judgments involve questions of how to interpret a statute or the relevant policy
considerations when developing a legal standard, such as a regulatory rule or the content
of an executive order. Obviously, some policy judgments are designed precisely to be
carried out through the exercise of targeted discretionary decisions. The Social Security
Administration promulgates standards governing benefit payments, thereby making a
policy judgment about how to use its targeted discretion. When government freezes
allegedly terrorist assets, the State and Treasury Departments implement statutory
standards from the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), as
interpreted through policy judgments in the president’s executive orders. But despite
139
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their overlapping contours, these different sorts of discretion should nonetheless be
distinguished. Though others may disagree, it seems as though policy judgments call for
a different kind of review compared to targeted discretionary decisions that so often
involve applying rules or standards to a particular set of facts. Whatever the arguments
for deferring to the executive branch when an agency writes a rule or a president signs an
executive order, those arguments seem at least somewhat weaker when the executive
branch claims to be applying a given standard to the facts. In the latter case the implicit
claim is: “we may have to apply some judgment, but when we detain someone as an
enemy combatant, freeze assets, or inspect an industrial plant, there’s no question about
the purpose we are serving. We’re enforcing the law.”
No doubt sometimes government officials will argue that the details of a policy
judgment – like precisely what behaviors make a charity liable to have its assets frozen –
should not be made entirely public.143 They might also argue that, in some domains such
as presidential decisions involving executive agreements, standards reflecting policy
judgments should develop organically in response to experience instead of being fixed
144
ahead of time, or that any review system at all would wreak havoc. Even if one finds
these positions attractive on the surface, it seems easier to think about them if we accept
at least some distinction between the following classes of decisions: decisions that
explicitly disavow consistency with any standard, decisions that fix a standard that is
supposed to apply across cases, and decisions that apply standards (or even quite general
values) to specific cases. To the extent that executive authorities claim to be applying a
standard, then arguments against review become exceedingly difficult to accept. Though
some may even insist that certain discretionary decisions involving national security (for
example) are entirely immune from any standard,145 in most cases such a claim seems
hard to reconcile with a simple but persistent imperative: that government decisions
should not be arbitrary. Indeed, audits of executive discretion may prove viable even
when the decisions in question superficially appear less amenable to sampling. It may be
possible to modify audits to shed light on applications of discretion drawn from a sparse
set of decisions, or on policy discretion exercised in the course of rulemaking, by
aggregating cases from different domains into a larger population from which to
sample.146
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B. Most Institutional Design Problems Have Plausible Solutions
While a framework for conducting audits is adaptable almost by definition,
practical questions of institutional design lurk just beneath the surface. The most
immediate such question concerns what discretionary decisions should be prioritized for
auditing in a world of scarce resources. It is plainly obtuse to seek audits of the most
trivial discretionary actions and informal adjudications.147 Even if this were not so, scarce
resources should compel auditors to set rough priorities. In doing so, auditors should
probably draw on at least four factors reflecting defensible intuitions about the underlying
goals of the audit system: (1) the extent (or absence) of alternative review mechanisms,
or factors favoring interest group or legislative reactions likely to reduce the probability
of bureaucratic failure, (2) the costs of discretionary decisions (particularly erroneous
ones) to individuals or groups aggrieved, (3) the existence of a standard against which
decisions could be assessed, or the relative feasibility of constructing such a standard
from sources such as public executive branch declarations about the particular objectives
of discretionary action in a given context (more on this below); and (4) the potential
availability of information that an auditing authority could use to evaluate decisions.
Such a framework avoids placing traffic stops at national parks at the same level of
priority as enemy combatant designations or social security claims. It also avoids facile
reliance on pre-existing, and potentially problematic, notions of where the greatest
problems lie in the exercise of executive discretion.
Regardless of what discretionary decisions are audited, the question of how large
a sample to use depends, as a prescriptive matter, on the costs and benefits of larger (as
opposed to smaller) samples. As a practical matter, the auditor’s approach to sampling
might also be informed by political circumstances that translate into resource constraints
(akin to the aforementioned “maximum acceptable cost” of review), and by prior beliefs
about the desired deterrent effect on decisionmakers. Ordinary statistical theory offers a
straightforward framework to calculate the appropriate sample given certain desired
parameters reflecting the decisionmaker’s desired level of confidence in the results.148
Although this formulaic analytical approach does not capture all the nuances with which
an auditor must contend, it does reveal some important considerations. For one, there is
no textbook answer to the question of how large a sample should be. Decisionmakers do
not (and ought not to) choose desired levels of confidence in a vacuum. As is true of
courts and legislators structuring the analogous judicial domain, decisionmakers have
reason to consider the costs as well as the benefits – which means that smaller samples
may sometimes be appropriate even if larger ones are more representative. Since
resource constraints can force a trade off between stringency of review (for any given
case in the sample) and breadth of review, then decisions about sample size should
depend, in large measure, on prior guesses about the slope and shape of the curve
depicting the impact of stringency on the probability of discovering problems in
decisions.
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Those choices regarding sample size should also reflect the fact that sample size
has diminishing marginal returns. Counter-intuitively, as the size of the total population
of decisions increases beyond a certain point, then the proportion of that population that
must be reviewed to gain a reasonably accurate picture of the whole population actually
declines. Sample sizes of between five hundred and a thousand observations may
provide a revealing statistical snapshot even when drawn from exceedingly large
populations.149 This suggests that auditing only a tiny fraction of a large population and
reviewing the sample carefully might yield valuable new information. Smaller
populations (for example, all the cases of the 500 or so individuals currently held in
Guantanamo) pose more of a challenge, since even a sample that constitutes a higher total
percentage of the population can prove less useful in making statistical inferences if the
sample is numerically small in absolute terms.150
Now juxtapose the insights of statistical and organization theory, and several
implications emerge. If the total population of cases is large enough to allow the auditor
to choose between 500 and 1000 cases without exceeding the maximum acceptable cost,
then the resulting analysis will likely exhibit desirable properties of reliability even if the
sample is a tiny proportion of the total population of cases (for example, the total number
of indictments issued over several years, or the total number of disability
determinations).151 If the cost of obtaining a sample of that size is allegedly prohibitive,
or if the total population is too small to audit hundreds of cases, then the auditing process
is best understood not as a means of obtaining a statistically reliable picture of conditions
in the population, but as a kind of pilot study informing decisions about the merits of
existing review procedures. And even small samples subject to audits can expand
knowledge considerably.152 Finally, regardless of the size of the population, the
149
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proportion of cases audited can be adjusted to achieve the related but distinct goal of
deterring malfeasance by placing decisionmakers on notice that some proportion of their
choices will be scrutinized.
Sample size also depends on whether audits are meant to address both over- and
under-enforcement. Audits could, for example, include both instances where targeted
discretion resulted in some sanction or cost being imposed (creating the potential for socalled Type I errors), as well as those instances where it was not imposed (Type II
errors). For example, should someone audit just those cases where a charity was
designated as a global terrorist organization, or also those where sanctions were not
imposed? It’s quite likely that we would learn a good deal from including the cases
where powers were not used. But this would raise two problems that demand attention.
First is deciding whether the expanded population of cases should include the whole
universe (i.e., every charity, or perhaps every charity operating in the Middle East) or just
“near misses” (charities that attracted the attention of State, Treasury, the CIA, or the
NSC but, perhaps because of political considerations, were not specially-designated).
The former is more accurate but would so quickly consume auditing resources that it may
prove unworkable, at least initially. In response, auditors could design pilot studies,
some of which could be targeted to domains where under-enforcement appears likely to
be a more pronounced problem a. The latter is simpler but less accurate. The second
problem is overcoming the likely political resistance (from the executive branch, who
would already have reason to resist audits) that would arise if auditors further expand
their mandate to include discretionary decisions not to act. Part IV returns to the question
of how auditors could mitigate more general problems of political resistance over time,
and explains how such resistance can have the laudatory effect of giving auditors reason
to cultivate reputations for impartiality.
The prospect of overcoming political resistance to audits depends in part on what
precise institutional actor shoulders the burden of auditing. To some observers, it may
seem as though courts lack the inclination, legal authority, culture, or expertise necessary
to engage directly in audits, though they could probably appoint masters to do some of
this work and they could fashion doctrines conditioning deference on the existence of
reliable auditing done by someone else, or providing for audits as a remedy in the
(unlikely) case where litigation itself reveals bureaucratic failures.153 By rewarding
bureaucracies with reliable audit structures, courts could advance two interrelated
objectives. They could contribute to mechanisms likely to enhance the overall quality of
discretionary decisions (relative to some defensible, socially-relevant standard of quality
encompassing, for example, reductions in the probability of obvious mistakes), and they
would be creating the conditions for enriching the information on the basis of which a
court can resolve specific cases. To the extent that courts are viewed as unable to require
audits given constraints in their ability to impose procedures not explicitly grounded in
statutes,154 legislators could create an Article I court with a distinctive mission and
resources to build specialized capacity – or an entirely separate bureaucracy. Among
existing agencies, the GAO and IG Offices are best positioned to do this sort of work
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(though, as I note below, they have largely avoided doing so). In short, while audits
could be performed by existing federal audit bureaucracies, a combination of judicial and
legislative innovation could lower barriers preventing Article III courts from more easily
encouraging audits.
Whatever the precise organizational structure, the auditor must be invested with
the power to compel production of evidence and testimony. In the absence of such
power, it would be hard for the auditor to delve into enemy combatant designations or
container inspections more aggressively than a court could. Sensitive information could
be reviewed in-camera, an approach that would further weaken the argument that review
should be precluded because the information involved is too sensitive.155 Because this
problem has been so often managed in other contexts, I suspect any objection to audits
relying on it is a red herring. Recent history is full of examples where this problem has
been solved.156 In addition to courts reviewing the information in camera, high profile
commissions like the September 11 Commission and expert working groups routinely get
security clearances and access to classified information.157 The resulting, publicly
disclosed work product either omits classified information or provides some redacted
summary version of it.
Regardless of whether the case involves sensitive information or not, what
standard would the auditor use to evaluate it? Ideally the statutes or constitutional
provisions implicated in the discretionary decisions would provide some standard for the
auditor to use, even when the standard is too vague for courts to apply. Or the auditing
authority can analyze whether a number of statutes and constitutional doctrines together
could be taken to imply conditions on the use of discretionary powers.158 The auditor
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could even use statements from the executive branch itself to see whether the audited
cases seem to be consistent with those statements.159 In some circumstances, where the
executive refuses to articulate an explicit standard to fill in gaps left by executive,
legislative, or judicial silence, the auditor itself could articulate a reasonable standard
(which is, by the way, what the GAO and IG do in related context, when they audit
“broad management practices”). The standard might reflect insights drawn from
constitutional interpretation, policy considerations, or even statutes’ legislative history.
A final issue concerns the consequence of audit results. As an initial thought
experiment, imagine that the auditor labors under a default presumption that the results of
its investigation will simply be announced to the public. A striking feature of audits may
ultimately prove their capacity to enhance how executive authority is policed without
directly delivering relief. What this would accomplish depends on the reactions of
legislators and the mass public, which can vary depending on the circumstances.160 Not
everyone among the public would care enough about how laws are applied on their behalf
to respond with indignation to audit results revealing arbitrariness in the process to
determine who is allegedly raising money for terrorists or engaging in environmental
violations. Nonetheless, as Part III notes, reports from existing audit bureaucracies turn
out to already generate dozens of stories in national newspapers and television networks.
Thus, public disclosure may have the potential to impact crucial features of the political
game as the executive branch seeks to demonstrate its competence.
But audits’ touchstone is their flexibility. The auditor might be empowered to
impose belated sanctions whenever audits reveal problematic cases. A woman
improperly barred from entering the country could be allowed to return. Assets that
should not have been frozen could be unblocked. Enemy combatants could be set free.
This is certainly a principled position, though it obviously raises certain costs associated
with the audits, and could ultimately affect their political feasibility.161 A third approach
is for the results of audits to trigger additional procedural standards, such as review of
more decisions through stratified sampling targeting areas where problems have been
newly discovered. Perhaps more important, auditors and courts may gradually come to
view themselves in a symbiotic relationship, as courts adjust their calculus of deference
to executive action in response to audit results or the existence of audit programs for
authority including a mixture of judges and non-judges would have more flexibility to articulate standards).
It is, rather, to point out that courts’ reluctance to articulate standards when they find them missing on the
face of a statute should not be taken as an indication that such an enterprise is fruitless.
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particular sectors of activity, and auditors adjust the standards they use to audit cases in
response to judicial elaborations of statutes or constitutional doctrines.
In any event, the choice among these alternatives is not one that can be taken in a
vacuum. It is likely to depend heavily on some of the political considerations I discuss in
Part IV. What’s important is to think of the choice not only in terms of what benefits
could be provided to aggrieved individuals, but also (more generally) how different
remedial schemes are likely to impact agencies’ willingness to learn from their mistakes
and structure its work to avoid future abuses. In short, through careful institutional
engineering, analogies to existing, institutions, and some experimentation, most of the
“problems” identified can be solved. We might then ask whether such problems have
been solved already.
III.
WHY REFORMS WOULD CONTRAST SHARPLY WITH THE STATUS QUO
The analysis began (for expositional clarity) by focusing primarily on court
review of executive discretion. In reality, though courts have distinctive legal powers,
they are but one component of a larger web of institutions potentially capable of
overseeing executive discretion. The value of supplementing judicial review with a new
program for auditing executive discretion depends largely on whether or not such audits
are already commonplace. Audits of targeted discretion may sound like exactly the sort
of work that the GAO and the IG Offices already do. These audit bureaucracies were,
after all, created to audit the government, and their jurisdiction has expanded to include
investigating the management of government programs.162 Their activities are sometimes
directed by legislators, who (in turn) can proceed with their own audits. Do they?
A. Federal Bureaucracies Do Not Ordinarily Perform Audits
For the audit bureaucracies the answer is generally “no.” These agencies
undertake a tremendous amount of interesting and often quite valuable work on
bureaucratic performance. The scope of their authority is quite broad. The GAO, for
example, has the power to examine “any matter” relating in some way to the
disbursement of public money.163 The Inspector General offices in federal departments
have a similarly broad mandate.164 Yet they appear to rarely perform audits of executive
discretion involving random (or stratified) sampling of legally consequential
discretionary decisions, assessed against a defensible standard (either a pre-existing one
or articulated by the auditors).
A small literature addresses the historical origin, legal jurisdiction, organization,
and culture of these audit bureaucracies.165 But we know relatively little about what the
reports of these audit bureaucracies are about, what methods they use to develop their
analyses, whether these reports contain recommendations that agencies actually
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implement, and whether any of this gets media attention. These questions are relevant to
the present project because they affect whether there is a deficit of the kinds of audits I
recommend, and their answers help us learn something about how audit bureaucracies
could enhance their supervision of executive discretion.
Some preliminary answers emerge from the initial results of a more extensive,
ongoing study of the audit bureaucracies currently underway. The results reflect an
analysis of 400 Inspector General and GAO reports issued during the last five years. The
reports analyzed assess the work of five major government agencies with a broad
spectrum of responsibilities.166 The analysis reveals audits of executive discretion (i.e.,
analyzing (1) a random sample (2) of executive branch legal determinations and (3)
identifying or defining a standard against which to assess such decisions) to occur in
fewer than 2% of the reports in the sample.167 Fewer than one in five reports in the
sample appear to use any sampling from a larger population, and the vast majority of
these focused on the traditional financial accounting functions that convey almost no
information about how an agency uses its legal discretion to affect directly the fortunes of
individuals or groups.168 Not a single one focuses the inquiry on domains where an
agency exercises significant legal discretion, defines a standard in advance, and reviews a
subset of cases at random.
Some reports occasionally chronicle problems in
administrative systems like those governing aviation security. Nonetheless, audits of
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executive discretion are essentially missing from the picture of the audit bureaucracies’
work. For instance, the GAO’s otherwise thorough report on the Transportation Security
Agency’s computerized aviation security system shows how carefully the agency
reviewed the architecture of the computer algorithm and the management practices
associated with the systems. It did not, however, pick a subset of names to inquire
exhaustively how they ended up on the list or what evidence supported that
determination.169
Notice that the distinction between audits of executive discretion and most of the
existing work done by the audit bureaucracies is not just a matter of what government
conduct is analyzed, but how the analysis is undertaken. Procurement investigations, for
example, are a predictable staple of GAO investigations given legislators’ interest in
dramatizing fraud and the potential cost recoveries that can help the agency justify its
own budget. Most such investigations focus on areas where the agency or its legislative
masters already perceive a potential problem. No examples existed among the reports
analyzed where the agency picks a random sample of procurement transactions to
examine how they have been carried out. The audit bureaucracies may have certain
valuable pre-existing information about where problems exist. But as the tax analogy
demonstrates, that information is unlikely to be pervasively correct, and in any case the
selection of a random sample of transactions to audit further burdens participants trying
to evade review by anticipating the agencies’ priorities.
The preliminary results from the GAO/IG project also permit a partial response to
two concerns likely to be raised by skeptics of audits. First, would anyone in the public
actually care about the results of the audits? Even at this early point in the empirical
phase of the project, it appears as though GAO and IG Office reports get a considerable
amount of attention in the print and television media. An analysis of the number of
stories in the New York Times and in transcripts of television news stories between
January 2002 and January 2005 mentioning the GAO or IG Offices reveals that the audit
bureaucracies receive considerable media attention. Nearly a thousand articles during
this period appearing in the New York Times mention the GAO or the IG offices. A
random sample of 200 of those news stories indicates that, while only about 3% of the
stories involving the GAO appear on page 1, about 10% of those mentioning the IG
Offices do so. Audit bureaucracies are also discussed on broadcast news and cable
channels. Even in these media, nearly a hundred news segments mention the various IG
Offices, and about 30 mention the GAO.170 These figures exceed the number of mentions
garnered by many federal cabinet agencies.
Second, would the agencies merely ignore the prescriptive implications of audits?
If they did, then the promised learning bonus from audits would be unlikely to
materialize. Although data are not yet available regarding the recommendations of the IG
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offices, I have already gathered data on all the approximately 10,000 discrete
recommendations made by the GAO over the last 15 years. The data cover
recommendations to the full range of federal government agencies, from Interior to the
State Department. An analysis of such data proves revealing. After the GAO makes
recommendations to an agency in its reports, its staff generally conduct follow up
interviews, additional investigation, document reviews, and issue queries to the agency
leadership. The audit agency then determines (on the basis of these qualitative methods)
whether a given recommendation is implemented sometime during the next four years.171
Nonetheless, about 79% of recommendations are implemented, perhaps in part because
of the potential media attention reports generate. These results must be interpreted with a
measure of sagacity. For example, the extent to which recommendations are adopted
may be endogenous to what the recommendation is – with simpler ones (i.e., “write a
report on the quality of the vehicle fleet for the Secret Service”) being implemented much
more than complicated or difficult ones (“reduce the extent to which the Secret Service
works on simple credit card fraud cases instead of critical infrastructure protection”).
The adoption of recommendations is likely to be influenced by political factors, such as
the extent of division in appropriations and authorizing subcommittees that oversee the
agency in question. It is likely, too, that departments with different bureaucratic
structures, institutional cultures, and particularly those with greater prestige, have
different reactions to the GAO recommendations. What makes little sense is to reject the
relevance of the audit bureaucracies, even if they do not currently perform the sorts of
audits that would generate critical missing information about the use and abuse of
executive discretion.
B. Neither Do Legislators
Another possible setting where audits of executive discretion could take place is
in the legislature, where hearings to oversee the bureaucracy are routine and legislators
often complain loudly about what agencies have done. As it turns out, most legislative
oversight activity has virtually nothing to do with systematically auditing targeted
discretion. In Part III I suggest some of the reasons why, as with the audit bureaucracies,
there seem to be so few audits of targeted discretion. In what follows I just want to
provide a brief outline of what legislative oversight activity tends to look like, and how
this is different from targeted discretion audits.
Legislators depend on oversight of the bureaucracy to achieve their goals. Soon
after legislators arrive in Washington, many of them almost invariably find they can reap
considerable rewards from oversight activity. It lets them achieve desired policy goals.
It also lets them claim credit for making the government work more efficiently and
effectively. As a consequence, legislative oversight activity takes on a bewildering array
of forms, including – among others – formal committee and subcommittee hearings, staff
investigations of bureaucratic practices, direct contact between a legislator and an
agency’s leadership, meetings with the White House to enlist its support in pressing a
bureaucracy into service, and control of the appropriations process.172 In the mid-1980s,
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political scientists Mat McCubbins and Tom Schwartz introduced what has become an
incredibly durable framework for thinking about legislative oversight of the
bureaucracy.173 Police patrol oversight involves legislators using their time, staff, and
other resources to engage in fairly constant vigilance of agency outputs – primarily
through staff investigations and committee hearings. In contrast, “fire alarm” oversight
requires less constant attention from legislators and their staff. Instead, legislators wait
for “fire alarms” to be pulled by interest groups and portions of the public (occasionally,
perhaps when galvanized by media attention to some perceived regulatory problem). To
encourage this sort of activity, legislators create procedures such as the federal
Administrative Procedure Act and the Freedom of Information Act that let groups more
easily learn what’s going on. Legislators rely on these parties to assist (implicitly) in the
oversight process. In short, fire alarms involve two related features: (a) reliance on
interest groups (or, on occasion, a politically engaged citizenry), and (b) episodic
legislative responses to instances where these groups express profound concern with
some aspect of bureaucratic activity.
Useful as it is from a political perspective, fire alarm oversight is precisely the
opposite of a random audit. Unless legislators directly create a procedure to audit
targeted discretion (they haven’t so far), then fire alarms would virtually never involve
auditing, but rather sharp responses when problems have already surfaced. Moreover,
because targeted discretion often (though not always) affects individuals or groups
without ready access to political power, fire alarm oversight would be particularly
unlikely to uncover problems. In contrast, police patrol methods are much more
consistent with the kind of audits I describe. Yet there is little evidence from
congressional testimony and hearings that this is the sort of oversight that legislators do
directly. In fact, what their public statements seem to suggest is that if anyone is doing
the kinds of audits that reveal problems with government, it’s the GAO and the IG
Offices, not their own staff.174
No doubt that congressional investigations often uncover important trends or
problems in bureaucratic activity, whether such investigations are triggered by fire alarms
or they arise from more pervasive police patrol methods. While it is true that some forms
of legislative control can substitute for other mechanisms – like audits – two basic facts
might nonetheless make audits of executive discretion distinctive compared to most of
what legislatures, courts, and audit bureaucracies currently undertake. (1) Legislators
train their attention on what catches their attention, not on a random sample of
discretionary decisions. Decisions that are not reviewed randomly (or through a stratified
random sample) tend to provide a biased sample. The results skew the picture of
bureaucratic activity that emerges, either because of inherent characteristics in the sample
or because the players being “audited” strategically distort what they’re doing in the
decisions more likely to be audited. Cases that are not reviewed at all don’t become the
subject of any legislative, political, or public pressure. (2) Even when legislators and
their staff choose to focus on a particular agency function, their oversight does not
necessarily imply review of specific decisions. As with the audit bureaucracies, oversight
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hearings may focus on systemic issues such as an agency’s policy priorities or its
handling of obvious crises. While staff may occasionally review random samples of case
files, this is not a routine component of legislative hearings. From a prescriptive point of
view, the results may provide less explicit – and instead more ambiguous – findings,
which are harder to interpret and have less to say about whether government is
performing effectively.
IV.
WHY AUDITS FACE POLITICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS
Judicial review is likely to do a poor job of generating information useful in the
oversight of executive discretion, because the standard of deference is often set too high
to yield a meaningful chance of discovering problems. Audits could tell us more, at a
reasonable cost. But they rarely happen. Why?
A. Political Actors Have Polarizing Incentives
Two important sets of actors who have stakes in the work of the executive branch
may find their goals cut against audits of executive discretion. Officials in the executive
branch (and their allies in the legislature) could institute an audit system internally. They
could support its implementation by the GAO and IG offices. Or they could advocate for
it in the legislature. The other set of players involves those legislators (and their allies
among organized interest groups) who are generally opposed to expansive power in the
executive branch.175
Here is the problem. Other things being equal, executive branch officials would
be loath to part with discretion. Discretion helps authorities carry out the functions that
they are expected to, like keeping threatening people out of the country, prevailing in
military operations abroad, or (at least some of the time) keeping industrial workplaces
safe. Discretion is also valuable because it helps create certain impressions among
superiors, legislators on appropriations committees, interest groups, and the public.
People respond to what they can see. Executive discretion lets government officials (or
their subordinates) choose what seems to be happening in a given area of the law. It
stands to reason that losing some of this power is not a welcome prospect. Neither is it
desirable to face the additional costs and the possibility of embarrassment that come with
more stringent audits. One might expect supporters of executive power in the legislature
to take a similar position.176 And some officials may simply crave power for its own
sake. In short, other things being equal, executive authorities and their allies should be
expected to seek more discretion, and less review. Unless those authorities have reason
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to limit their flexibility in order to demonstrate their competence,177 these players would
probably prefer to avoid the embarrassment of an audit that does not show them
succeeding, and to retain the benefits of the flexibility implied by that discretion.
What about legislators concerned about limiting executive power? Think first of
the legislators who tend to distrust what the executive branch is doing. As noted earlier,
legislators tend to lack incentives to audit rather than to rely on police patrol methods.
Even assuming that the conditions are present to make these legislators want to use police
patrol methods instead of just waiting for an interest group to complain, it’s not obvious
that the critics of executive power would want to press for rigorous audits instead of
simply polarizing the debate or attempting to embarrass their political opponents.178 A
highly polarized debate has some benefits. It may galvanize support among certain
constituencies. And opposition legislators (along with their allies in external interest
groups), enthralled by the prospect of an optimal gamble, may prefer to win across the
board than to support solutions that no doubt seem to some like flimsy half-measures.
One can tell much the same story about advocacy organizations outside
government. If the issue is the treatment of enemy combatants, for example,
organizations such as Human Rights Watch may strongly prefer a system where
authorities implement the Hamdi decision in a way that drastically cuts down on
executive discretion. Audits may seem like a poor alternative by comparison. The
choice between promoting audits (as a compromise) or pressing for a more stringent
standard of deference across the board thus depends, as before, at least in part on the
players’ subjective assessment of the probability that they will prevail in advocating for
the across-the board standard. No doubt some determined advocates of more stringent
judicial review would ground their commitments on their perception that courts are more
politically insulated from legislative or executive pressures than the audit bureaucracies.
They may laud courts’ role in articulating the underlying nature of constitutional
commitments, or to directly impose reforms on public bureaucracies through structural
injunctions.179 But in practice, these principled rationales may exacerbate a perception
among critics of executive authority that measures short of substantially more stringent
judicial supervision would yield little or no benefit.
In short, polarization among political advocates seeking maximal advantage in
their efforts to expand or limit judicial review probably diminishes the extent of political
interest in review mechanisms that may be socially optimal. When players have more
polarized views about executive branch power, substantive policy and law, or both, they
probably have less to gain from investing a compromise. Conceptually, audits embody
just such a compromise. Their architecture necessarily resonates most with observers
who simultaneously worry about the drawbacks and benefits of greater review of
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executive discretion, and least with those for whom such a syncretic exercise seems
unnecessary.
B. Institutional Inertia Locks In Existing Conceptions of Adjudication
To the extent that lawyers concerned with the exercise of discretionary powers
view themselves as zealous advocates on behalf of individual clients, they may find little
solace in a system that randomly selects cases for review. Even observers without
individual clients to represent may naturally seek to focus attention on strategies to obtain
direct relief for aggrieved individuals. This conception is likely to exist in some tension
with the notion that more can be learned through reviewing fewer cases more thoroughly,
even if the role of audits is to supplement rather than replace such review. Observers
emphasize the value of adjudication as a recourse that should be available to, and provide
a remedy, to similarly-situated parties. Judgments that don’t provide a remedy may strike
some observers as ridiculous, and why some scholars have persuasively shown how it
makes little sense to think about adjudication constitutional rights without “equilibrating”
that adjudicatory process with the remedies in question.180
Audits of executive discretion do not conform to these assumptions. In a narrow
sense, they randomly privilege some people – whose cases are selected for audits – and
not others. They do not provide an obvious remedy, though it is certainly possible to
forge a system that makes remedial contributions by affecting the ordinary course of
181
judicial review. They seem, as a result, to be ill-fitting proxies for a persistent set of
concerns that underlie the normative case for less deferential adjudication. It is
undoubtedly true that constitutional provisions and values may require adjudication, and
that many deficiencies in adjudication are best remedied through changes in adjudication.
Nonetheless, it seems equally clear that the prevailing conception of adjudication
could unduly dampen interest in audits. It promotes the misleading sense that the value
of audits are primarily seen where an individual abuse (or mistake) is discovered, and
corrected. Instead, the point of audits is to shed light on the entire system and how it
works. This has always been a concern of adjudication as well, but perhaps it sometimes
gets lost amidst the pressing rhetoric about protecting individual rights. Courts inclined
to serve as a counterweight can do so by crediting, during arbitrary and capricious or
substantial evidence review, agencies who incorporate credible audits of their decisions,
or who have been subject to such audits from the GAO and Inspector General offices
recently. Although Vermont Yankee and similar cases preclude the full range of judicial
elaboration of new procedures, it does not strain the existing scope of review to suggest
that courts should attend to the internal and external procedures shaping the extent to
which a specific agency decision becomes arbitrary.182
Indeed, while Vermont Yankee may arguably limit courts’ abilities to directly
impose audit requirements through expansive interpretations of the Administrative
Procedure Act, audits seem directly germane to the familiar procedural due process
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balancing framework ordinarily traced to Mathews v. Eldridge.183 By privileging the
importance of accuracy-enhancing mechanisms, Mathews implies that (where protected
interests are at stake) auditors’ work could illuminate questions central to procedural due
process analysis, such as the probability that individuals or groups will suffer erroneous
deprivations under existing (as opposed to plaintiff-requested) procedures.184 As they
respond to conceptual and political objections, auditors (and audit supporters) may thus
find solid ground from which to emphasize the potential intersections between the work
of courts and auditors.
C. Narrow Conceptions of Auditor Mission Prevail
Like all bureaucracies, the GAO and IG Offices are also affected by prevailing
conceptions of their mission found among its internal staff and leadership as well as
external constituencies. Government employees who have some flexibility to choose
what to do and how to do it tend to make choices reflecting – at least in part – their own
sense of the mission they are supposed to carry out. Those choices can reinforce external
perceptions, which in turn affect the work referred to the agency, the financial resources
it receives, the people who apply for jobs there, and the standards used to evaluate
whether the agency is succeeding in its work. Together these factors then combine with
the more prosaic political pressures both within and outside the agency to shape its work
environment.
Since the GAO and IG offices were created to serve as auditors, at least one
factor shaping the priorities of these bureaucracies is rooted in organizational conceptions
of how the role of an auditor should be defined. The legislators who created these
bureaucracies and their successors may have long thought of these bureaucracies as a
means of detecting financial mismanagement or malfeasance. In the late 1970s, a GAO
report commented on legislative plans to create IG offices, and emphasized the urgent
importance of auditing the finances of government agencies. A scholarly commentator
notes how this report emphasized the tenor of the congressional discussion at the time:
Surveying every unit of the federal government, from whole agencies to small
program offices, GAO found that almost a third had not had a financial audit
since 1974. In unusually dramatic prose on the front cover, the report announced:
“One hundred and thirty-three units, with annual funding in excess of $20 billion,
told GAO they had not received a financial audit during fiscal years 1974 through
1976.185
Politics has cemented the early focus on financial auditing and procurement.186
The audit bureaucracies’ legislative overseers expect them to demonstrate results, both in
the sense of providing useful vehicles for legislators to achieve their own strategic
objectives and in the more prosaic (and often overlapping) sense of detecting financial
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improprieties that, where rectified, produce additional government revenues.187 In some
ways, these constraints are a reflection of legislators’ own aforementioned incentives.
Legislators can nudge or even force these agencies to undertake work the lawmakers
desire. Given these realities, it is not surprising that the audit bureaucracies so
consistently seem to embrace the fire alarm (and, to a more limited extent, the police
patrol) approach associated with legislative oversight.It’s not easy to find legislators or
executive branch officials in favor of waste, fraud, or (financial) abuse – though
(particularly for the GAO) it’s certainly plausible to think that the content and
aggressiveness of investigations targeting such problems would change depending on the
partisan composition of the legislature and executive branch.188
On occasion, legislators may find audit bureaucracies useful to generate publicity
and promote policy objectives not related to the advancing the ubiquitous mantra of
eliminating waste, fraud, and abuse.189 Nonetheless, the legislative requests that drive a
considerable proportion of the GAO’s work (and probably some of the work of Inspector
General’s offices) appear to reflect considerable resilience in the extent to which the audit
bureaucracies are viewed as experts in investigating financial management: who spent
what funds, why government vehicles were used for that trip, or why these employees
were asked to work on some questionable task. The same may be largely true of
managers and officials within the agencies themselves. Many Inspectors General have a
background in financial management or accounting, as do a considerable proportion of
staff at the GAO.
The audit bureaucracies are not entirely devoid of flexibility. It would almost
certainly prove misguided to see the political and organizational constraints on audit
bureaucracies as insurmountable, or their mission as entirely static. Even if they were,
there is likely more than just legislative pressure at work in determining the audit
bureaucracies’ agenda. Recurring disagreements among legislators almost certainly leave
the audit bureaucracies with a measure of discretion. Existing law already provides both
the GAO and IG offices with broad jurisdiction to audit executive discretion. Over the
last few decades, the audit bureaucracies have used that jurisdiction to generate (often at
congressional request) the broad analyses of management practices and administrative
priorities in public bureaucracies that, together with the aforementioned financial audits,
constitute the bulk of their work.
Still, change is unlikely to come easily. Whether the audit bureaucracies assume
the responsibility for auditing executive discretion or a separate auditing authority is
created, greater use of that jurisdiction to effectively audit executive discretion depends
in large measure on demand from politically significant constituencies such as legislators
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and organized interest groups. Although change in their agendas is not impossible, the
preceding discussion shows it to be unlikely. If political forces do not directly foster
change then the fate of audits depends on the prospects for a degree of autonomy among
the audit bureaucracies themselves.190 Despite appearances to the contrary, it is neither
necessary nor sufficient merely to enhance the formal independence of the audit
bureaucracies. As with minority-protecting institutional rules like the Senate filibuster,
legal changes in an agency’s formal autonomy can invariably be undone unless the
agency has managed to enshrine the notion (among politically relevant elites or the larger
public) that its autonomy should be protected.191 The development of public
bureaucracies during the last century provides ample evidence of agencies responding
reflexively to political demands, but also of agencies forging coalitions and manipulating
their political environment to become founts of major policy innovation as the nation
evolved.192 At the Postal Service, the Forest Service, and the Food and Drug
Administration, agency leaders empowered by having successfully led transformations of
staff selection and promotion paths became determined policy innovators by cultivating
193
As the audit bureaucracies
support among professional elites and the mass public.
themselves evolve, their leaders may gradually awaken to the simple realization that they
are capable of acquiring some measure of autonomy along these lines, overcoming
political constraints by cultivating reputations for relative impartiality and technical
competence. In the process, the audit bureaucracies remain capable of playing a unique
and exceedingly valuable part in public life by auditing executive discretion. Their
greatest legacy may lie in steadily forging coalitions that would make it possible for them
to play that role.
CONCLUSION
The inexorable logic of executive discretion destines it to carry risks as well as
rewards. Pervasive discretion lets government protect the environment, prosecute serial
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rapists, keep workers safe at industrial sites, and fight battles to protect its citizens. But
history writes a damning indictment of discretion’s abuse. It describes not only how
Nixon’s IRS embarrassed his enemies, or how Hoover’s FBI libelously fed speculation
that slain civil rights workers were promiscuous, mentally-ill subversives, but also how
even the most determined and virtuous government officials fail to learn from their
mistakes when they don’t know they have committed them. None of this should be
surprising given what is known about organizations, the people who run them, and the
complicated legal mandates entrusted to them.
This article considered the implications of these facts in light of two other
realities. Judicial review does not constrain the exercise of many forms of executive
discretion that would nonetheless almost certainly benefit from some external review.
Regulatory and prosecutorial enforcement decisions are among the most cogent
examples. And we do next to nothing to audit how that discretion is used, despite the
presence of compelling reasons to think that executive branch officials will have a
relentless tendency to frequently misuse that discretion. Because some discretionary
actions can signal competence and resolve to naïve observers among the mass public,
executive officials may have an incentive to use their discretion to create favorable
impressions. Some officials or their employees may be far less subtle and engage in
willful misconduct that is unlikely to be detected. Even the most noble officials and
organizations may have a harder time learning without external mechanisms to
systematically review and critique their work.
When policymaking elites and organized interests discuss the costs and benefits
of executive discretion, they tend to respond by fueling a familiar debate about the value
of greater judicial scrutiny of executive discretion. While this article does not dismiss the
value of such greater scrutiny, particularly in the provision of discrete remedies for
aggrieved individuals and groups, it offers an alternative to the polarized rhetoric of that
debate. It effectively says: even if one accepts that more stringent judicial review is
impossible, one should not therefore accept that the correct result is to let the executive
branch’s wheels keep on spinning as they always have. The key to that alternative is to
recognize that a substantial dimension of the problems associated with policing executive
discretion involve information. Information is what impels the case for audits, which in
turn hold the promise of severing the connection between the perceived costs of
encroaching on discretion (both in terms of direct review costs and in terms of
interference with the valuable characteristics of discretion) and the stringency of review.
Indeed, government powers to inspect, fine, prosecute, enforce, and detain may rightly
seem less threatening if their use can be effectively monitored through audits or similar
procedures.
On the other hand, it may seem at first as though audits would only work if we
lived in a world perfect enough to make them unnecessary in the first place. But the
institutional design problems associated with auditing executive discretion call for an
altogether subtler diagnosis. Instead, four dynamics help explain that continuing embrace
of judicial review, and the concomitant absence of activity auditing targeted discretion.
When lawyers and policymakers erase the distinction between targeted discretion and
broader policy judgments, they unduly restrict the scope of options available to help
balance discretion’s benefits and costs.
Which is just fine for presidential
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administrations, executive officials, and legislators supporting executive power: They
will tend to be perfectly happy to let that power evade more frequent review. Somewhat
counter-intuitively, advocates of restraining that power may also have incentives to
oppose audit-like approaches as a matter of political strategy, because it lets them sound
the alarm to their supporters while they fight for more aggressive review across the
board. That fight happens in a context permeated by persistent (yet ultimately
misleading) norms about the appropriate relationship between adjudication and review of
executive discretion, and similarly durable conceptions of what existing auditors should
do when they supervise government agencies. Weakening these dynamics may require
propitious circumstances and Herculean feats of advocacy, but not the “perfect world”
that would let us dispense with audits (or, indeed, judicial review) altogether. In the
course of navigating the imperfect world in which law actually operates, the possibility of
auditing executive discretion can be treated as a problem of institutional design. The
discussion thus engendered can encompass questions about who should audit, how large
samples should be, what standard should be used, or what should be the universe of cases
to audit.
But a rich discussion of the means and methods for auditing executive discretion
may serve a more immediate function. As a thought experiment, audits help elucidate the
conceptual murkiness of many arguments for executive discretion and emphasize the
underappreciated importance of audit bureaucracies such as the GAO and the Inspectors
General. Surely it is naïve to assume reflexively that each unchecked discretionary
decision amounts to a disaster. What borders on madness is to think those decisions will
turn out just fine when existing law lets them so easily escape scrutiny. If executive
discretion is to be defended coherently against audits, the case for it must necessarily
transcend the reflexive critiques of judicial supervision or the veneration of an
amorphous, ill-defined political process. Instead, the case for insulating discretionary
decisions from audits must provide a uniquely eloquent exaltation of the value of public
ignorance.

